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INTRODUCTION 
The growth of public employee unionization, a development 
subject to significant popular and scholarly commentary in the de-
cade of the seventies, 1 continued unabated in the 1980s. Recent 
statistics indicate that thirty-seven percent of employees in federal, 
state, and local government are union members, 2 and that there 
are 659 major collective bargaining agreements covering 2,487,000 
state and local government employees.3 Since 1980, statutory col-
lective bargaining provisions have been enacted or expanded in ten 
states.4 
1 See generally J. GRODIN & D. WoLLETT, LABOR RELATIONS AND SocIAL PROBLEMS (2d 
ed. 1975); D. STANLEY, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER UNION PRESSURE (1972); H. 
WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, jR., THE UNIONS AND THE CrnES (1971); Edwards, The Emerging 
Duty To Bargain In The Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REv. 885 (1973); Kneeland, Public job Unions 
Mount Counterattack for Raises, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1975, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.). 
2 News and Background Information, 133 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 143 (Feb. 19, 
1990). These figures are for 1989. · 
3 Davis & Sleemi, Collective Bargaining in 1989: Negotiators Will Face Diverse Issues, 112 
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 10, 11 (Jan. 1989). These statistics include only collective bargaining 
agreements that cover 1000 or more employees in state and local government. Id. at 10. 
There are numerous other agreements covering fewer employees. See Clark, Jr., Public Sector 
Collective Bargaining Agreements: Contents and Enforcement, in THE EVOLVING PRoCESS-
CoLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 407, '107 (1985). 
4 Illinois and Ohio enacted comprehensive bargaining statutes in 1983 and 1984 re· 
· spectivcly. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1601-1627, 1701-1720 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & 
Supp. 1990); Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 4117.01-.23 (Baldwin 1983 & Supp. 1989). Delaware, 
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, and Nebraska made significant legislative 
changes in their bargaining laws. In Delaware, Iowa, Maine and Maryland, the newly enacted 
statutory provisions covered additional classifications of employees. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 
19, §§ 1601-1608 (1985) (police officers and firefighters); IOWA CoDE ANN. § 602.1401(3) 
(West 1988) (judicial employees); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 31, 32 (1989) (judicial 
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In contrast to the private sector, collective bargaining statutes 
in the public sector are enacted in the context of numerous laws 
governing the terms and conditions of employment of public em-
ployees. 5 Foremost among these pre-existing statutes are those es-
tablishing, or authorizing the establishment of, civil service6 or merit 
systems. 7 Because civil service laws, and the agencies created by such 
laws,8 unilaterally set terms and conditions of employment for pub-
lic employees, a statute that provides for bilateral determination of 
employment terms through collective bargaining poses obvious po-
employees); Mo. ANN. CooE art. 28, § 5-;114.l(aHh) (1986) (park employees). Michigan 
added compulsory arbitration of labor disputes for state police. See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 
§ 423.271-.287 (West Supp. 1990). Nebraska enacted the State Employees Collective Bar-
gaining Act as a supplement to the Industrial Relations Act, which covers state employees. 
NEB. REv. STAT. § 31.1372 (1987). The State Employees Collective Bargaining Act added 
significant provisions to the Industrial Relations Act, including a specification of bargaining 
units for state employees and a number of prohibited practices. See id. § 81-1369 to -1390. 
Minnesota enacted the Public Employment Labor Relations Act in 1984, which replaced the 
Public Employment Labor Relations Act of 1971. Significant changes included a provision 
that the employer's obligation to negotiate exists notwithstanding contrary municipal charters, 
ordinances, and resolutions. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.07(2) (West Supp. 1990). In 
addition, the New Mexico State Personnel Board issued rules and regulations providing for 
collective bargaining for state employees in 1983. Regulations for Labor Management Relations, 
4A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 749, at§ 41:207 (Sept. 30, 1983). 
5 See Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. 
L. REv. 919, 921-30 (1969). 
6 Although many statutes establish a civil service system for state and/or local government 
employees, see, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT.§ 23-2503 (1987), others simply authorize local govern-
ment units to establish civil service systems, either prescribing specifics of the system to be 
established at the local governing body's option, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 38.451 
(West 1985), or allowing the local governmental unit to implement a system of its own choice, 
see, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 241.002-.006 (1987). These differences may play a significant role 
in the determination of whether the collective bargaining statute or the civil service statute 
has priority. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
7 According to a 1970 survey by the National Civil Service League, approximately 80% 
of full-time government employees are covered by a merit system. See R. KEARNEY, LABOR 
RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 167 (1984). A merit or civil service system is a set of 
personnel administration practices. Couturier, Public Sector Bargaining, Civil Service, Politics 
and the Rule of Law, in PORTRAIT OF A PROCESs-COLI.ECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EM-
PLOYMENT 57, 64 (1979). The merit system is designed to implement the merit principle, the 
"concept ... that employees should be selected and retained solely on the basis of merit." 
LABOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND THE MERIT SYSTEM 13 (1972) (citing Na-
tional Governors' Conference, Report of Task Force on State and Local Government Labor Relations 
18 (1967)) [hereinafter LMSA]. As noted by Professor Vaughn, among others, however, the 
merit principle is both more complex and less clear than the definition suggests, and the civil 
service system has expanded to provide many functions unrelated to the merit principle. See 
R. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW 9-27 (1976). 
8 Civil service statutes generally create a board or commission to administer and enforce 
the law, and to promulgate rules and regulations for implementation of the law. See R. 
VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 9-28. 
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tential for conflict. 9 Commentators and practitioners vary in their 
views about the implications of collective bargaining for civil service 
and the merit principle.10 Some commentators have stressed the 
incompatibility of collective bargaining and civil service, suggesting 
either a never-ending conflict or the doom of one of the two sys-
tems.11 Most commentators and practitioners, however, believe that 
the two systems can be accommodated.12 Indeed, a review of the 
existing collective bargaining statutes and the administrative and 
court decisions thereunder demonstrates that such accommodation 
is taking place currently at the state and local level. 
This article undertakes such a review with respect to one aspect 
of the potential conflict between merit systems and collective bar-
gaining-employee discipline and the appeal of discipline deci-
sions.13 Protection. from arbitrary or unjust discipline is a primary 
9 See id.; Aaron, Final Report of the Assembly Advisory Council on Public Employee Relations, 
in LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS, supra note l, at 159. 
1° Compare Morse, Shall We Bargain Away the Merit System, 25 PUB. PERSONNEL REv. 239, 
241-43 (1963) with Stanley, What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems, 31 PUB. PERSONNEL REV. 
108, 108-13 (1970). 
11 See Lewin & Horton, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on the Merit System in Government, 
30 ARB.J. 200-01 (1975) and works cited therein; R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 170; LMSA, 
supra note 7, at 43-44 and works cited therein. Lewin and Horton attribute this view to the 
fact that the authors of the early literature were primarily personnel administrators. Lewin 
& Horton, supra, at 200. 
12 R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 170; see Lewin & Horton, supra note 11, at 201; LMSA, 
supra note 7, at 44-50 and works cited therein. 
13 Section I of this article provides an overview of the background and development of 
civil service in public employment. See infra notes 32-51 and accompanying text. Section II 
provides an overview of the background and development of collective bargaining in public 
employment. See infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text. Section III discusses the potential 
conflict between civil service law and collective bargaining law. See infra notes 74-82 and 
accompanying text. 
Because this article focuses on the conflict between civil service and collective bargaining, 
it does not treat statutory provisions and case law dealing solely with certificated educational 
personnel (primarily teachers) unless they are covered by civil service law rather than separate 
statutory tenure provisions. Scope-of-bargaining cases involving teachers are often compli· 
cated by issues of the delegability of certain functions entrusted to the school board by statute. 
See, e.g., West Irondequoit Bd. of Educ., 4 PERB 11 3070, aff'd on reh'g, 4 PERB 11 3089 (N.Y. 
Pub. Employee Relations Bd. 1971), aff'd sub nom. West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 
35 N.Y.2d 46, 52, 315 N,E.2d 775, 778, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720, 724, 87 L.R.R.M. 2618, 2620 
(1974). Although these issues are similar in some respects to issues of conflict with civil 
service, the differences in the law involved render them beyond the scope of this article. 
Similarly, the article omits discussion of public employees covered by the Railway Labor Act 
rather than state collective bargaining statutes, and transportation employees whose bargain· 
ing rights are secured by the Urban Mass Transit Act. See Nolan, Public Employee Unionism in 
the Southeast: The Legal Parameters, 29 S.C.L. REv. 235, 244-53 (1978) for a discussion of the 
applicability of these two statutes to public employee bargaining. Finally, the article has 
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motivation for employee unionization.14 As a result, achieving pro-
tection from unjust disciplinary action becomes a fundamental goal 
of unions in collective bargaining.15 Public sector unions in the 
United States are particularly interested in "discipline, grievance 
procedures and organizational due process."16 
One traditional function of a civil service commission is to 
provide a procedure and appellate body for appeal of disciplinary 
decisions.17 Union members, however, do not view the civil service 
commission as an impartial body for review of disciplinary decisions 
but rather view it as part of management's personnel system.18 For 
that reason, unions increasingly have attempted to negotiate both 
standards for employee discipline and contractual grievance pro-
cedures for challenging such adverse actions. 19 These increasing 
efforts to negotiate contractual limitations on management's disci-
plinary authority and contractual procedures for appeal of man-
agement's disciplinary decisions have posed the issue of whether 
civil service standards and procedures or contractual standards and 
procedures should govern disciplinary decisions. The issue arises 
not only in contract enforcement actions, but also in contract ne-
gotiations when management resists bargaining about discipline and 
grievance and arbitration machinery on the basis that civil service 
laws prohibit negotiation over such matters. 
omitted discussion of a few other statutes that have limited employee coverage. See, e.g., ME. 
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1281-1294 (1988 & Supp. 1989) Gudicial employees). 
An attempt has been made to include relevant decisions of the state administrative 
agencies as well as of the courts. Because of the limited publication and distribution of 
administrative decisions in some states, it is possible that some relevant administrative deci-
sions are not discussed herein. The conclusions with respect to the status of the law in each 
state are based on the decisions available and cited herein. 
14 See N. CHAMBERLAIN &J. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 2 (3d ed. 1986). 
15 A union is a democratic and political organization and therefore its collective bar-
gaining goals are defined by the wants and needs of its members. See D. BoK &J. DUNLOP, 
LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 77-79 (1970). 
15 Lewin, Collective Bargaining Impacts on Personnel Administration in the American Public 
Sector, 27 LAB. L.J. 426, 432 (1976). 
17 H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note l, at 158. 
18 Feigenbaum, Civil Service and Collective Bargaining: Conflict or Compatibility?, 3 PuB. 
PERSONNEL MGMT. 244, 250 (May/June 1974) (citing Jerry Wurf, president of the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME")); Wurf, Merit: A Union 
View, 34 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 431, 432 (Sept./On. 1974). As a general purpose public sector 
union, AFSCME has the largest membership. 1:. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 28. The National 
Education Association, which represents employees in education, has the largest membership 
in the public sector. See H. EDWARDS, R.T. CLARK, JR. & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAw 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 15-16 (3d. ed., 1985) (citing GIFFORD, DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR 
ORGANIZATIONS 3 (1984-85 ed.)). 
19 R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 189-90. 
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Section IV of this article reviews the approaches of the various 
states that have addressed the issue, analyzing them in light of the 
policies underlying the two statutory schemes-collective bargaining 
and civil service.20 In some states, statutory provisions address the 
question and resolve the conflict.21 In others, the statute is silent, 
but courts have addressed the issue and reconciled the two stat-
utes. 22 These resolutions run the gamut from giving priority to the 
collective bargaining agreement to precluding any negotiation of 
the discipline issue. 23 In many states, the issue has not been ad-
dressed directly by the legislature or the courts. 24 
Section V argues that the approach that best accommodates the 
policies of merit employment and collective bargaining25 is one that 
allows the parties to negotiate alternatives to civil service procedures 
and standards that will prevail over civil service upon agreement of 
the parties to the negotiations.26 Collective bargaining over discipli-
nary decisions and appeals procedures in no way threatens the merit 
20 See infra notes 83-273 and accompanying text. In addition to providing the basis for 
an analysis of the most effective approach for accommodating collective bargaining and civil 
service, this review of state approaches to the relationship of civil service and collective 
bargaining collects and categorizes the law of various states on this issue for the use of both 
academics and practitioners. See Appendix II for a chart of these approaches by state. 
21 See infra notes 132-58, 174-239 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 90-101 and accompanying text. 
23 Compare Hillsborough County Govt!. Employees Ass'n v. Hillsborough County Avia-
tion Auth., 522 So. 2d 358, 363 (Fla. 1988) with State Employees Ass'n v. New Hampshire 
Pub. Employee Labor Relations Bd., 118 N.H. 885, 889-90, 397 A.2d 1035, 1037-38, 100 
L.R.R.M. 2484, 2486 (1978). 
24 In some states, there is no enforceable duty to bargain. In others, there arc simply 
no reported decisions. See infra notes 83, 88 and accompanying text. 
25 This approach assumes the legitimacy of the goals of both statutes-encouraging labor 
.peace through collective bargaining and ensuring that employees in the public service arc 
selected and retained on the basis of merit. Although there is room for disagreement about 
the value of these goals and the effectiveness of existing systems for achieving them, such 
debate is beyond the scope of this article. By enacting both collective bargaining requirements 
and civil service laws, the state legislatures have determined that the statutory goals arc 
appropriate public policy for the state. The purpose of this article is to determine the 
legislative and decisional accommodation that maximizes the public policy underlying both 
statutes and avoids undue interference with either. For a criticism of civil service, see Savas 
& Ginsburg, The Civil Service: A Meritless System, 32 THE Pun. INTEREST 70, 70-80 (1973). For 
a criticism of the collective bargaining system, see Klare, judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner 
Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 267 (1978) 
and works cited therein. The article notes that "it has been argued that collective bargaining 
has become an institutional structure not for expressing workers' needs and aspirations but 
for controlling and disciplining the labor force and rationalizing the labor market." Id.; see 
also R. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 
92 YALE LJ. 1357, 1357, 1403-08 (1983) (statutory collective bargaining systems should be 
eliminated in favor of common law). 
26 See infra notes 274-350 and accompanying text. 
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principle or the public interest.27 Indeed, such bargaining may 
strengthen the merit principle in significant ways. 28 At the same 
time, negotiation over discipline furthers the goals of public em-
ployee bargaining legislation. It ·allows employee participation in 
the determination of working conditions and permits the parties to 
determine the important issues for negotiation and the best ways 
to resolve such issues in light of the particular employment rela-
tionship, thereby promoting labor peace.29 
Section VI concludes that, in most states where the law does 
not currently permit such negotiation, this result can be achieved 
easily by either appropriately interpreting existing statutes or im-
plementing minor statutory amendments.30 Legislatures contem-
plating enactment of collective bargaining statutes should anticipate 
this issue and address it directly, thereby avoiding the difficult issues 
of statutory interpretation that have plagued courts in states with 
no explicit statutory provision. 31 
l. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW 
The modern civil service system had its origins in the Civil 
Service Act, or Pendleton Act, which was passed by Congress in 
1883.32 After passage of the Pendleton Act, civil service reform 
spread rapidly to state and local governmenl~33 By 1970, eighty 
27 See infra notes 291-350 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 321-39 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 340-42 and accompanying text. 
so See infra notes 351-88 and accompanying text. 
s1 In Michigan, for example, the statute contains no language regarding its effect on 
existing civil service laws. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-423.216 (West 1978 & 
Supp. 1990). The result of this omission has been extensive litigation over whether various 
matters covered by civil service laws are subject to negotiation and, where negotiated, whether 
the provisions are enforceable through binding arbitration or litigation. See, e.g., Council 23, 
Local 1905, AFSCME v. Recorders' Court Judges, 399 Mich. 1, 8-9, 19, 248 N.W.2d 220, 
222, 227, 94 L.R.R.M. 2392, 2397 (1976); Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v. Pontiac, 397 Mich. 
674, 676-77, 246 N.W.2d 831, 832, 94 L.R.R.M. 2175, 2175 (1976); Wayne Civil Serv. 
Comm'n v. Board of Supervisors, 384 Mich. 363, 368-71, 184 N.W.2d 201, 202-04, 77 
L.R.R.M. 2034, 2034-36 (1971); Township of Clinton v. Contreras, 92 Mich. App. 297, 300-
03, 284 N.W.2d 787, 788-89, 103 L.R.R.M. 2464, 2464-65 (1979). 
s2 R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 1-3. Prior to 1883, partisan political activity provided the 
basis for public employment decisions. Feigenbaum, supra note 18, at 244. The assassination 
of President Garfield in 1881 by a disappointed office seeker aided the civil service reform 
movement in its push for legislation, resulting in the Pendleton Act covering federal em-
ployees. Id. 
ss Couturier, supra note 7, at 57. 
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percent of state and local government employees were covered by 
some form of merit system. 34 
The civil service reform movement had two primary goals: (1) 
to remove political partisanship as a basis for employment of civil 
servants; and (2) to provide for selection, promotion, and retention 
of government employees on the basis of merit.35 Thus, the civil 
service systems were designed to implement these two purposes. 
The typical merit system is administered by a nonpartisan board or 
commission that establishes rules and regulations governing per-
sonnel administration. 36 The commission ensures that the move-
ment of personnel into, out of, and within the system is governed 
by merit, fitness, and competence.37 Over the years, however, the 
authority of civil service commissions has expanded to many areas 
of employment relations beyond personnel movement.38 Civil ser-
vice commissions are not only involved in recruitment, examination, 
preparing lists of eligible candidates, appointment and promotion, 
. but also assignments, demotions, transfers, layoffs and recalls, dis-
charges, training, salary administration, attendance control, safety, 
grievances, pay and benefit determination, and classification of po-
sitions, 39 many of which are unrelated to the merit principle of 
employment.40 
Discharge and demotion are traditionally viewed as directly 
related to the merit principle.41 Nevertheless, in the initial wave of 
civil service reform, laws did not deal with removal of incompetent 
employees.42 Reformers believed that, by requiring that appoint-
ments be based on merit, the laws removed the incentive for im-
"" R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 167 (citing a National Civil Service League survey of 
state and local government). According to the survey results, 84% of cities, 83% of counties, 
and 96% of states had some form of coverage under a merit system. Id. Federal law requires 
merit system coverage for all state and local employees who arc paid with federal funds. Id.; 
see 42 U.S.C. § 4701 (1988). 
35 R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 167. 
36 Id.; Rehmus, supra note 5, at 926-27. 
37 R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 167; Helburn & Bennett, Public Employee Bargaining and 
the Merit Principle, 23 LAB. LJ. 618, 619-20 (1972). 
38 Comment, The Civil Service-Collective Bargaining Conflict in the Public Sector: Attempts al 
Reconciliation, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 826, 828 (1971); Anderson & Weitzman, The Scope of 
Bargaining in the Public Sector, in PORTRAIT OF A PROCESS--COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 173, 175 (1979). 
39 See Comment, supra note 38, at 828; Helburn & Bennett, supra note 37, at 620; R. 
KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 168. 
40 See Rehmus, supra note 5, at 927; Comment, supra note 38, at 828; Hclburn & Bennett, 
supra note 37, at 623. 
41 See Helburn & Bennett, supra note 37, at 620. 
42 R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 1-17. 
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proper termination.43 Thus, the Pendleton Act prohibited removal 
of civil service employees for political reasons but contained no 
other limitations on discharge and discipline.44 Eventually, however, 
restrictions on discharge evolved, in accordance with the belief that 
employees should be terminated only for incompetence or other 
job-related reasons.45 
Civil service statutes typically restrict the public employer's dis-
cretion to discharge and to impose other serious discipline, such as 
demotion and suspension, by limiting discipline to just cause46 or 
specifying permissible reasons for termination, such as incompet-
ence or unfitness for service.47 In addition, most civil service statutes 
allow employees who are discharged or suspended for disciplinary 
reasons to appeal the disciplinary decision through civil service 
channels. 48 In most cases, the appeal to the civil service commission 
is the culmination of an appeals procedure that progresses from 
lower to higher levels of management.49 Under some statutory 
schemes, lesser disciplinary penalties are appealable,50 but the more 
typical provision limits appeals to severe disciplinary action, such as 
suspension, demotion, reduction in pay, and discharge.51 
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
With few exceptions, collective bargaining in public employ-
ment developed after the enactment of civil service laws. 52 The 
43 Id. at 1-23. 
44 See id. 
45 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT.§ 19-1832 (1987); R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 5-3, 5-36 
to 5-39. In addition to the statutory and administrative protections of civil service law, 
constitutional due process protections also evolved for public employees. Id. at 5-3. For a 
discussion of the evolution of constitutional protections, see id. at 5-;3 to 5-35. 
46 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, para. 10-1-18 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (employees 
in the classified service of a municipality may be discharged only for cause); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 71, § 741.807 (Purdon Supp. 1990) (employees in state classified service can be terminated 
only for just cause). 
47 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-1832 (1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 241.425 (1987). 
48 Stanley, What are Unions Doing to Merit Systems?, 31 PuB. PERSONNEL REv. 108, 111-12 
(1970); see, e.g., WASH. REv. CoDE ANN.§ 41.06.170(2) (Supp. 1990); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 19-
1833(5) (1987). 
49 Stanley, supra note 48, at 111. 
50 See, e.g., N.Y. C1v. SERV. LAw, §§ 35.5(a)(3), 35.6(b)(2) (McKinney 1983) (unsatisfactory 
performance rating appealable); id. §§ 75.2, 75.3, 7~ (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990) (repri-
mands require a pre-disciplinary hearing before imposition, and decision to reprimand is 
appealable); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 31, §§ 35, 41 (1988) (transfer appealable). 
51 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT.§ 19-1833(5) (1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 41.06.170(2) 
(Supp. 1990). 
52 Comment, supra note 38, at 828. Delaware is one of the few exceptions. The Delaware 
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earliest collective bargaining statutes were enacted in the 1950's.58 
Since that time, collective bargaining in the public sector has rapidly 
increased.54 Unions and collective bargaining "are now recognized, 
albeit not. always accepted, facts of life in the United States."55 
Changes in the legal environment for collective bargaining in the 
publi_c sector have been both a cause and an effect of increasing 
unionization. 56 
Several significant public policies have motivated the enactment 
of public sector bargaining statutes. First, as the size of government 
has increased, so too has the isolation of government workers.57 In 
order to gain a sense of control over the work environment, these 
employees frequenJly look to collective action, and thus to unioni--
Z(!.tion .. 58 In the absence of the ability to engage in c;ollective bar-
gaining, 59 the pressure·s exerted by unionized employees seeking a 
voice in determining the work environment and demanding im-
proved wages· and· benefits60 lead inevitably to labor unrest, and 
often to strikes injurious to the public interest.61 Thus, legislation 
:requiring collective bargaining with unions that have demonstrated 
representation of a majority of employees furthers labor peace and 
minimizes disruption of public services.62 Second, it provides em-
collective bargaining st;J.tute was enacted in June, 1965, one year before the civil service 
statute. R1,1benstein, The Merit System and Collective Bargaining in Delaware, 20 LAB. L.J. 161, 
161-62 (1969). 
55 Edwards, supra note l, at 886. States that enacted legislation in the 1950's included 
Wisconsin, New Hampshire, and Minnesota. Id. at 886 n.4. 
54 Id. at 886. 
55 Id. 
56 See R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 10-11, 14; Burton, The Extent of Collective Bargaining 
in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 13-15 (Aaron, Grodin, Stern eds. 1979); 
Weber, Prospects for the Future, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 6 (J. 
Grodin, D. Wollett, & R. Alleyne, Jr. 3d ed. 1979). 
57 H. WELLINGT01'1 & R. -WINTER, supra note 1, at 12. 
58 Id. at 13. 
_.
59 Even it;i_.the absence of statutory authority, courts have held that public employees 
have a first amendment right to join unions. See Mcl.:aughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288, 
71 L.R.R.M. 2097, 2098 (7th Cir. 1968); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068, 1075, 
70 L.R.R.M. 2732, 2736-37 (W.D.N.C. 1969). 
' 
60 111 the view of govern~!'!nt employ~es, the gap between government wages and private 
sector wages has widened. LMSA, supra note 7, 3;t 5. In ~ddition, the traditional advantage 
of government employment-substantial fringe benefits-has been eroded by improvements 
in private sector benefits, many of which are attributable to unionization. Id. In recent years, 
government retrenchment resulting in decreased security of public sector employment may 
have further motivated employees to unionize. See R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 187-88; see 
also Shaw & Clark, The Practical Differences Between Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 
19 UCLA L. REv. 867, 867-68 (1972). 
61 Edwards, supra note 1, at 885-86. 
62 See id.; H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note l, at 8; see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT, ch. 
48, para. 1701 (Smith-Hurd 1986). The Illinois statute states, in pertinent part: 
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ployees with a method of participating in their "own governance,"63 
i.e., determining their own terms and conditions of employment. 
Lastly, because unions also politically represent the employees, col-
lective bargaining legislation increases political activism and repre-
sentation, which are valued in the democratic system.64 
Collective bargaining laws typically require negotiation about 
wages, hours, and working conditions or some variant thereof.65 
Under virtually any description of the subjects over which bargain-
ing is required, unions will claim the right to negotiate the standards 
and procedures for discipline, as well as a procedure for challenging 
disciplinary decisions. This procedure most commonly is a grievance 
procedure culminating in binding arbitration by an impartial arbi-
trator. 66 In the private sector, approximately eighty-six percent of 
collective bargaining agreements contain a provision requiring just 
cause for discipline67 and approximately ninety-eight percent con-
It is the public policy of this· . . . Act to promote orderly and constructive 
relationships between all educational employees and their employers. Unre-
solved disputes between the educational employees and their employers are 
injurious to the public, and the General Assembly is therefore aware that 
adequate means must be established for minimizing them and providing for 
their resolution. 
Id.; see also IowA ConE ANN. § 20.1 (West 1989). The Iowa statute states, in pertinent part: 
The general assembly declares that it is the public policy of the state to promote 
harmonious and co-operative relationships between government and its em-
ployees by permitting public employees to organize and bargain collectively; to 
protect the citizens of this state by assuring effective and orderly operations of 
government in providing for their health, safety, and welfare. 
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.201 (West 1981). The Florida statute states, in pertinent 
part: 
Id. 
It is declared that the public policy of the state, and the purpose of this part, is 
... to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between government 
and its employees, both collectively and individually ... by assuring, at all times, 
the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of government .... 
These policies are best effectuated by: (1) Granting to public employees the 
right of organization and representation; (2) Requiring the state, local govern-
ments, and other political subdivisions to negotiate with bargaining agents duly 
certified to represent public employees. 
65 H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note l, at 8, 12-13. 
&< Id. at 8, 12. 
65 LMSA, supra note 7, at 66, 68-69; see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327(b) (1989); 
MrcH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 423.215 (West 1978). 
66 See R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 166; D. STANLEY, supra note 1, at 50. 
67 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) § 40.1 at No. 1142 (Basic Patterns: 
Discharge, Discipline and Resignation) (Mar. 9, 1989). This estimate is based on a BNA 
survey of some 400 sample contracts. The same survey found that grounds for discipline 
were provided in 94% of contracts. Contractual grounds for discipline typically were of two 
types-for just cause or for specific offenses. Even in the absence of a just cause limitation, 
many arbitrators would imply such a requirement for discipline. F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, 
How ARBITRATION WoRKS 652 (4th ed. 1985). 
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tain an arbitration procedure for resolving disputes regarding the 
interpretation and application of the agreement.68 In addition, 
many contracts contain procedural requirements for discipline such 
as notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard.69 Approx-
imately twenty-six percent of grievances arbitrated in the private 
sector are discharge cases. 70 
Like their counterparts in the private sector, unions in the 
public sector have sought to negotiate both grievance and arbitra-
tion procedures and disciplinary standards.71 The issues arbitrated 
in the public sector do not differ significantly from those arbitrated 
in the private sector.72 Because employees and unions view civil 
service commissions as an arm of management, unions have sought 
to replace civil service procedures for challenging discipline with 
negotiated grievance procedures that culminate in binding arbitra-
tion by a neutral party.73 Therein lies the potential conflict between 
civil service law and collective bargaining law as it relates to em-
ployee discipline. 
Ill. THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LA w 
The potential conflict between statutory bargaining require-
ments and civil service provisions arises in two ways. First, statutory 
provisions regarding the required subjects for bargaining tradition-
ally have been broadly written with few specific limitations. 74 Given 
the possible scope for bargaining, unions demand bargaining on all 
subjects arguably related to employment conditions in which their 
68 See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) §§ 51:1, 51:5 at No. 1140 (Basic 
Patterns: Grievances and Arbitration) (Feb. 9, 1989). This estimate is also based on BNA's 
sample of 400 contracts. All but one of the 400 contracts contained a grievance procedure. 
Id. § 51: I. In the one contract without a grievance procedure, disputes were referred directly 
to arbitration. Id. 
69 F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 67, at 674. 
70 This estimate is based on a review of the cases reported in volumes 79 to 85 of Labor 
Arbitration Reports (BNA). Of 2046 reported cases, 539 were discharge cases. Many other 
arbitration cases involve discipline short of discharge. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra 
note 67, at 650. , 
71 See R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 189-90; Stanley, supra note 48, at 111-12. 
72 F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 67, at IO & n.39 and works cited therein. 
73 See Stanley, supra note 48, at 111-12; Hayford & Pegnetter, Grievance Adjudication for 
Public Employees: A Comparison of Rights Arbitration and Civil Service Appeals Procedures, 35 ARB. 
]. 22, 22-23 (Sept. 1980). 
74 See Seidman, State Legislation on Collective Bargaining by Public Employees, 22 LAB. L.J. 
13, 15 (1971); Anderson & Weitzman, supra note 38, at 175; see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 75-
4327(b) (1989); M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 423.215 (West 1978). 
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constituents-the employees-have an interest. According to one 
commentator, "[g]rievance procedures ... are second only to wage 
and fringe benefits as an area of union concentration."75 One of the 
primary reasons for the emphasis on grievance procedures is to 
enable employees to challenge disciplinary actions.76 
When negotiations commence, management may refuse to ne-
gotiate restrictions on discipline and grievance procedures, claiming 
that bargaining is preempted by civil service law, which both governs 
discipline and provides the procedure for challenges. The dispute 
that must be resolved by reference to the two statutes-civil service 
and collective bargaining-is whether the subjects come within the 
scope of the collective bargaining requirement and, if so, whether 
the existence of civil service provisions on the same subjects removes 
them from the required scope of bargaining.77 
Second, the conflict may arise in an alternative context. Man-
agement may agree to contract provisions governing discipline and 
grievances without contesting their negotiability. When the union 
grieves a particular disciplinary action, however, management may 
refuse to process and/or arbitrate the grievance, claiming that the 
provisions are unenforceable because of the existence of civil service 
provisions on the same subjects.78 The union then must attempt to 
enforce the contract through legal action. 79 Although the context 
in which the action arises is different, the determination of the issue 
in a contract enforcement action is related to that arising in a 
refusal-to-bargain case. If discipline and grievance procedures are 
. not within the permissible scope of bargaining under the statute 
1s R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 189. 
76 Id. 
77 The dispute may be resolved by an administrative agency created by the bargaining 
statute, with an appeal to the courts or by the courts directly without a prior administrative 
determination, depending on the particulars of the statute. Cf ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, 
§ 979-H (1988) with TEX. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 5154e-l, § 18 (Vernon 1987). Under 
many statutes, the case will be initiated with a charge by the union that the employer is 
engaging in an unfair or prohibited practice. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 979-
C(l)(E), 979-H(2) (1988). In a few jurisdictions, the administrative agency I!lay determine 
whether a matter is within the scope of negotiations without an unfair labor practice charge. 
See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 34:13A-5.4(d) (1988). 
78 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 
66, 68-70, 391 A.2d 1318, 1319-20, 99 L.R.R.M. 3278, 3279-80 (1978). 
79 Again, as in the case of a refusal to negotiate, the union's case may be brought before 
an administrative agency or directly in court, depending on the statutory scheme. Cf Board 
of Governors v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 170 Ill. App. 3d 463, 466, 524 N.E.2d 
758, 759 (appeal from agency decision), with Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm., 481 
Pa. at 68-69, 391 A.2d at 1319-20, 99 L.R.R.M. at 3279-80 (appeal from decision of lower 
court). 
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because of the civil service provisions, then courts may find the 
existing contractual provisions unenforceable. 80 Thus, determining 
the appropriate scope of the statutory bargaining requirement and 
the impact of civil service law on that requirement is crucial.81 
The resolution of this question depends on both the language 
of the two statutes at issue and the public policy underlying the 
statutes, as expressed by the legislature. A review of the existing 
state collective bargaining laws82 reveals various ways of resolving 
the issue, both by statutory provisions and, where the statutes are 
silent, by case law. An analysis of law in various states provides 
guidance as to the method of deciding the priority of law that best 
comports with the public policy underlying both statutes. 
IV. STATE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE-COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING CONFLICT IN DISCIPLINE CASES 
The states that have addressed the issue of reconciling civil 
service law and bargaining requirements on employee discipline 
have used three basic methods.83 One group of states84 has specific 
statutory requirements with respect to the relationship of civil ser-
80 See, e.g., Devine v. City of Des Moines, 366 N.W.2d 580, 583, 122 L.R.R.M. 3109, 
3111 (Iowa 1985). 
81 A court or agency may find, without determining the requisite scope of bargaining, 
that the employer is estopped from refusing to comply with the contract it negotiated. See, 
e.g., Pittsburgh joint Collective Bargaining Comm., 481 Pa. at 72, 391 A.2d at 1321, 99 L.R.R.M. 
at 3280-81. This type of resolution is the exception rather than the rule, however. 
82 The reference to state collective bargaining laws includes laws enacted by state legis-
latures whether they cover state employees, local government employees, or both. 
83 Nine states have no statutory bargaining law, These include Arizona, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
In several of these states, bargaining by public employers is unlawful. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. 
STAT.§§ 95-98 (1989); Commonwealth v. County Board of Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 
581, 232 S.E.2d 30, 44 (1977). Although bargaining is permitted and, in fact, occurs in other 
states, see, e.g., Local 598, AFSCME v. City of Huntington, 1984-86 PBC (CCH) ~ 34,346 
(W. Va. 1984), because of the absence of both statutory provisions and an enforceable duty 
to bargain, the conflict between civil service law and collective bargaining has not arisen in a 
reportable manner. Therefore, the interplay of collective bargaining and civil service law in 
these nine states is not further discussed herein. For discussion of the legal status of public 
sector unionism and collective bargaining in the southeastern states, see Nolan, Public Employee 
Unionism in the Southeast: The Legal Parameters, 29 S.C.L. REv. 235, 235-304 (1978). 
84 Some states have different statutes governing different groups of employees and, 
thus, may fall into more than one category. For example, the Wisconsin law covering state 
employees has specific provisions regarding bargaining over disciplinary disputes, see Wis. 
STAT. ANN.§ lll.9l(b) (West 1988), whereas the law covering municipal employees contains 
no provisions regarding the relationship of civil service and bargaining over disciplinary 
matters. See id.§§ 111.70-.71. 
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vice disciplinary provisions and collective bargaining.85 Another 
group of states has general statutory provisions dealing with the 
relationship of the collective bargaining requirements and other 
laws, but no specific provisions regarding the discipline issue. 86 In 
many of these states, the administrative agency, the courts, or both 
have applied the statutory provisions in cases involving disputes 
over employee discipline.87 The third group of states has no statu-
tory provisions relating to the issue. 88 As in the group of states with 
general statutory provisions, courts and agencies in some of the 
states without specific statutory language have addressed and re-
solved the issue.89 Analysis of the statutes and decisional law in each 
85 See infra notes 132-58 and accompanying text. These states include Wisconsin (state 
employees), Nevada (local government employees), New Mexico (state employees), New 
Jersey, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Delaware, Oregon (state employees}, Vermont (municipal 
employees}, Maine (public employees other than state employees), and the District of Colum-
bia. See Appendix II for a chart categorizing the various state statutes. 
86 See infra notes 174-239 and accompanying text. These states include Alaska, Maine 
(state employees), Maryland (park employees and employees of the city of Baltimore}, Ver-
mont (state employees), Nebraska (state employees}, New Hampshire, Hawaii, Connecticut, 
Ohio, Iowa, Illinois (state and local employees and educational employees}, Washington, 
Pennsylvania, Texas (police and firefighters), Kansas, California (state employees and mu-
nicipal employees), and Florida. In some states, the statutory provisions relate to the conflict 
between the statute and/or contracts negotiated pursuant to the statute and other laws in 
general. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 904 (1985). Other statutory provisions relate 
specifically to the relationship of civil service law and the bargaining obligation. See, e.g., 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-272(c), (d) (West 1988). Some states have both types of provi-
sions. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 273-A:l(XI), § 273-A:3(III) (1987). 
87 See infra notes 144, 146, 156, 185-239 and accompanying text. 
88 See infra notes 90-131 and accompanying text. These states include Michigan, New 
York, Oregon (local government employees), Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Montana, Nebraska 
(local government employees), and Wisconsin (municipal employees). In addition, 11 states 
have some collective bargaining provisions, often limited to certain categories of employees, 
but no statutory provisions regarding conflict with other laws, including civil service laws, 
and no reported cases addressing the conflict between the collective bargaining Jaw and civil 
service. These states include Alabama (meet and confer for firefighters only}, Georgia (fire-
fighters only}, Idaho (firefighters only), Indiana (teachers only), Kentucky (firefighters in 
cities over 300,000 and others may opt in}, Louisiana (transit employees only), Missouri (meet 
and confer only with no bargaining requirement}, North Dakota (public employees have the 
right to join unions but the only bargaining statute is for teachers), South Dakota, Tennessee 
(teachers only) and Wyoming. Because of the absence of both statutory and decisional law, 
these states are not analyzed further, but the recommendations for dealing with these issues 
that are contained in section VI, infra, are applicable to these states as well. Fo_r a discussion 
of the difference between meet and confer provisions, such as those in Missouri and Alabama, 
and bargaining requirements, see Edwards, supra note 1, at 893-99. As previously indicated, 
this article does not deal with the statutory provisions regarding teachers, transportation 
workers, employees covered by the Railway Labor Act, and employees covered by limited 
separate statutes such as judicial employees in Maine. No attempt has been made to analyze 
such statutes for provisions regarding conflict with other laws. See supra note 13. 
89 See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text. 
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of these categories demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of 
the different approaches. 
A. The Silent Statutes 
In several states, 90 the legislature did not address the relation-
ship of the collective bargaining law to civil service statutes, leaving 
that task to the administrative agency and the courts. In some of 
these states, courts have addressed and resolved the issue; in others, 
the relationship of the two statutes remains unclear.91 A review of 
decided cases in these states with silent statutes reveals the status of 
the existing law with respect to negotiation over disciplinary matters. 
The Michigan courts have held· that the collective bargaining 
law has priority over the civil service law for local government 
employees where the two statutes are in conflict. This resolution 
has been based primarily on the later enactment of the collective 
bargaining law and the legislative intent that it govern public em-
ployment relations. 92 Specifically, the Michigan Supreme Court has 
held that the Public Employment Relations Act requires negotiation 
over disciplinary procedures and grievance and arbitration proce-
dures. 93 
90 The states with silent statutes are Michigan, New York, Oregon (local government 
employees), Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Montana, Nebraska (local government employees), 
and Wisconsin (municipal employees). 
91 This group of states differs from those listed in supra note 83, because, in most cases, 
the statutes are more comprehensive bargaining statutes and because one or more decisions 
on the relationship of collective bargaining and civil service is available. The issue of bar-
gaining over disciplinary matters, however, has not been clearly resolved. 
92 See Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Pontiac, 397 Mich. 674, 682, 246 N.W.2d 
831, 835, 94 L.R.R.M. 2175, 2177 n.20 (1976); Wayne County Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Board 
of Supervisors, 384 Mich. 363, 374, 184 N.W.2d 201, 205, 77 L.R.R.M. 2034, 2036-37 
(1971); Local 1383, IAFF v. City of Warren, 411 Mich. 642, 662, 311 N.W.2d 702, 709 (1981). 
With respect to state-classified civil service employees, however, the civil service law has 
priority because it was created by the state constitution. See Board of Control v. Labor 
Mediation Bd., 384 Mich. 561, 566, 184 N.W.2d 921, 923, 77 L.R.R.M. 2685, 2686-87 (1971). 
In addition, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the specific removal statute for probation 
officers prevailed over the Public Employee Relations Act and precluded an order to arbitrate 
the discharge of a probation officer. See Council #23, Local 1905, AFSCME v. Recorder's 
Court Judges, 399 Mich. 1, 6-7, 248 N.W.2d 220, 221-22, 94 L.R.R.M. 2392, 2392-93 
(1976). The court relied, in part, on the constitutional question that would be raised by 
delegating to a private arbitrator decisions about the employment of persons on whom judges 
relied heavily in sentencing decisions. Id. at 15, 248 N.W.2d at 225, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2395. 
93 Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n, 397 Mich. at 681, 246 N.W.2d at 834, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2177. 
See Clinton v. Contrera, 92 Mich. App. 297, 312, 284 N.W.2d 787, 793, 103 L.R.R.M. 2464, 
2468 (1979) (collective bargaining agreement providing for binding arbitration of suspension 
and discharge of police officer is enforceable). 
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Similarly, the New York courts have held that discipline is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining94 and that unions may agree to 
waive the employees' rights to civil service appeals and limit the 
employees to challenging discipline through the grievance and ar-
bitration procedure.95 In reaching this conclusion, the courts have 
relied on the absence of any clear prohibition on negotiation of 
dis"dpline in statutory or decisional law or public policy.96 The ap-
pellate court noted in Auburn Police Local 195, Council 82 v. Helsby, 
however, that, although disciplinary procedures per se are negoti-
able, there might be a specific bargaining proposal regarding dis-
cipline that would impinge on the merit principle, implying that 
such a proposal might require a different conclusion with respect 
to negotiability. 97 
The Oregon collective bargaining law contains no language 
regarding the relationship of civil service and collective bargain-
ing, 98 but the Oregon Supreme Court has held that the legislature 
intended the Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act ("PECBA") 
to prevail over conflicting local ordinances.99 Even where state stat-
ute authorizes the creation of the county civil service system, the 
94 See Auburn Police Local 195, Council 82 v. Helsby, 62 A.D.2d 12, 15, 404 N.Y.S.2d 
396, 398, 98 L.R.R.M. 3240, 3241 (1978), aff'd, 46 N.Y.2d 1034, 416 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1979). 
95 See id. at 17, 404 N.Y.S.2d at399, 98 L.R.R.M. at3242; Binghamton Civil Serv. Forum 
v. City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 28, 374 N.E.2d 380, 382, 403 N.Y.S.2d 482, 484, 90 
L.R.R.M. 3070, 3072 (1978); Antinore v. State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 6, 10-11, 371 
N.Y.S.2d 213, 216-17, 90 L.R.R.M. 2127, 2128-29 (1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 921, 389 N.Y.S.2d 
576, 94 L.R.R.M. 2224 (1976). 
96 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 
282 N.E.2d 109, 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 22 (1972); Auburn Police Local 195, 62 A.D.2d at 15, 
404 N.Y.S.2d at 399, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3241. In Associated Teachers of Huntington, the court 
addressed the negotiability of disciplinary standards and appeals procedures for teachers 
covered by tenure laws, but the case has been relied upon by New York courts to find that 
employers must negotiate these same subjects with unions representing civil service employ-
ees. See Auburn Police Local 195, 62 A.D.2d at 15, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 399, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3241; 
Binghamton Civil Sero. Forum, 44 N.Y.2d at 28, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 484, 374 N.E.2d at 382, 90 
L.R.R.M. at 3072. 
97 Auburn Police Local 195, 62 A.D.2d at 17, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 399, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3242. 
98 The collective bargaining statute covers state and local employees. See OR. REv. STAT. 
§ 243.650(18) (1987). The civil service statute for state employees, however, provides that 
the terms and conditions of employment for state employees represented by unions are to 
be set by the collective bargaining agreement rather than civil service law or regulations 
except for recruitment and selection of employees for initial appointment. Id. § 240.321(2),(3). 
The statute further specifies that grievances of represented employees are to be resolved by 
the collectively bargained procedure. See id.§ 240.321(4). See infra notes 157-58 and accom-
panying text for a description of the Oregon statute. 
99 See City of Roseburg v. Roseburg Firefighters Local No. 1489, 292 Or. 266, 278-81, 
639 P.2d 90, 97-99, 111 L.R.R.M. 2932, 2937-39 (1981). 
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collective bargaining law prevails, both because it was enacted later 
in time with an intent to apply uniformly to all public employees 
and because the civil service system is permitted, but not required, 
by statute. 100 Applying this reasoning, the Oregon Appellate Court 
held that negotiation over grievance and arbitration procedures for 
discipline is required. 101 
Similarly, the statutes of Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 
Nebraska (local government employees), and Wisconsin (municipal 
employees) contain no provisions addressing the conflict issue. In 
each state, there are some related decisions that rely on many of 
the same criteria as the courts in Michigan, Oregon, and New York, 
but the decisions do not definitively resolve the issue of whether 
bargaining over disciplinary matters is required where there are 
civil service provisions regarding discipline. Two Montana Supreme 
Court decisions address contractual disciplinary issues. In AFSCME, 
Local 2390 v. City of Billings, the court held that a contract that 
limited the right to discharge employees was binding, but no issue 
of conflict with civil service was raised.102 In City/County of Buttel 
Silver Bow v. Montana State Board of Personnel Appeals, the court held 
that the contractual grievance procedure did not cover terminations 
because the contract incorporated the Metropolitan Police Act, 
which provided for a police commission to decide termination is-
sues.103 The majority opinion mentioned the possibility of conflict-
ing decisions of the two bodies and suggested that the Metropolitan 
Police Act gave exclusive jurisdiction over discharges to the police 
commission. 104 The decision in Butte/Silver Bow suggests that the 
Montana Supreme Court would be receptive to an argument that 
civil service rules would prevail over the collective bargaining agree-
ment.105 
100 See AFSCME Council 75, Local 350 v. Clackamas County, 69 Or. App. 488, 497-98, 
687 P.2d 1102, 1108-09, 117 L.R.R.M. 2447, 2451 (1984). 
101 See id. at 495-96, 687 P.2d at 1107, 117 L.R.R.M. at 2450. 
102 See Local 2390, AFSCME v. City of Billings, 171 Mont. 20, 24, 555 P.2d 507, 509, 
93 L.R.R.M. 2753, 2754 (1976). 
103 See 225 Mont. 286, 289, 732 P.2d 835, 837, 125 L.R.R.M. 2956, 2957 (1987). 
104 Id. at 288-89, 732 P.2d at 837, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2957. The dissenting judge read the 
majority opinion as holding that the police commission has exclusive jurisdiction over dis· 
charges. Id. at 289, 732 P.2d at 837, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2957 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). 
105 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-3-4408 (1989), which authorizes local government civil 
service boards to adopt and enforce rules regarding appointment and employment that have 
the force of law. In Brinkman v. State, the Montana Supreme Court held that an employee 
could not sue the state for wrongful discharge based on an alleged violation of public policy 
where he had not exhausted the grievance and arbitration procedure in the collective bar· 
gaining agreement. 224 Mont. 238, 239, 245-46, 729 P.2d 1301, 1302, 1306, 124 L.R.R.M. 
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The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the issue of conflict 
between civil service law and collective bargaining requirements in 
AFSCME v. County of Lancaster. 106 The court ruled that the civil 
service statute, enacted subsequent to the collective bargaining law, 
was controlling where the two statutes were in direct confl.ict.107 To 
the extent that the civil service act contains "specific and mandatory" 
provisions regarding discipline, discharge, and the grievance pro-
cedure, the subjects are removed from the scope of negotiations. 108 
Correspondingly, where the civil service provisions are not specific 
and mandatory, the parties are required to bargain.109 This analysis 
is similar to that applied by the New York courts.no 
The Oklahoma statute, which covers police and firefighters 
only, requires arbitration for disputes over the interpretation of the 
contract. 111 The statute also provides that all rules, regulations, fiscal 
procedures, working conditions, departmental practices, opera-
tions, and administration in effect on the effective date of an agree-
ment are part of the contract unless expressly changed. ll2 This 
provision suggests that rules and regulations may be altered by the 
contract, but it is not clear whether this applies to departmental 
rules and regulations or rules and regulations established pursuant 
to civil service law. ll3 In the only state supreme court opinion on 
the issue, the court held that the parties must arbitrate whether the 
city must comply with an arbitration award reinstating a discharged 
2328, 3438, 2331 (1986). This decision suggests a policy favoring arbitration of disputes in 
the public sector and might support an ~rgument that arbitration should prevail over civil 
service law if civil service law regarding appeals of terminations does not expressly provide 
an exclusive remedy. 
106 200 Neb. 301, 263 N.W.2d 471, 98 L.R.R.M. 2340 (1978). 
107 Id. at 302-04, 263 N.W.2d at 473-74, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2341-42. 
10s Id. at 304-05, 263 N.W.2d at 474, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2342. 
109 Id. For the Nebraska civil service provisions on discipline, discharge, and grievance 
procedure, see NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-1307, - 1311(9) (Supp. 1987) (state employees); NEB. 
REv. STAT. §§ 19-1832, - 1833 (1987) (police officers and firefighters); NEB. REv. STAT. § 23-
2510 (1987) (employees of counties over 300,000); NEB. REv. STAT.§§ 23-2517, - 2522(1), -
2522(5), - 2525(15), - 2525(18), - 2528 (l987) (employees of counties of 150,000 to 300,000). 
110 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
111 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 51-111 (West Supp. 1989). 
112 See id. 
11
' Oklahoma statutes governing police and firefighters limit the authority to discharge 
such employees and allow municipalities to create civil service or merit boards. See OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 29-104 (West 1978) (members of fire department can be removed only 
for good and sufficient cause as provided by applicable law or ordinance); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 11, § 50-123 (West Supp. 19~0) (police officers may be terminated only for cause, and 
municipality must create a Board of Review with appellate authority over discharges unless 
a civil service or merit system has been established). 
114 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:95 
employee.114 The decision implied that a contractual arbitration 
award in a discharge case would be enforceable but the court did 
not decide the question. There was no discussion of a possible 
conflict with civil service.115 
Two Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board decisions ad-
dress related matters. In the first decision, the Board held that, 
where reclassification of civil service positions was mandated by law, 
the state did not commit an unfair labor practice by reclassifying 
without first negotiating with the union. 116 In the second decision, 
the Board found that a town's refusal to discuss with the union a 
grievance over the discharge of the police chief was an unfair labor 
practice.117 These decisions suggest that the Board would find that 
a mandatory statutory provision would remove discipline and dis-
charge from negotiations, but in its absence, negotiations might be 
required. 118 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has construed the Municipal 
Employment_ Labor Relations Act to require enforcement of an 
arbitration award in a discharge case.119 The court rejected the 
argument that enforcing the contract into which the city had en-
tered was an unlawful infringement on the city's legislative power.120 
In a later decision, however, the court ruled that a contract provision 
that contravenes a city ordinance is void, and overturned an arbi-
trator's award reinstating an employee who had violated the ordi-
nance.121 In still another decision, the same court disclaimed any 
intent to set forth a broad rule that ordinances control over con-
flicting contracts, but reasserted the general rule that laws prevail 
over contracts. 122 In addition, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held 
114 See Taylor v. Johnson, 706 P.2d 896, 899, 125 L.R.R.M. 3235, 3237 (Okla. 1985). 
11s Id. at 898, 125 L.R.R.M. at 3237. 
116 In re Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board and State of Rhode Island, Case No. 
ULP-3538 (Oct. 16, 1980), Gov't Empt. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 893, at 18 (Dec. 22, 1980). 
117 In re Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board and Town of Foster, Case No. ULP-
3612 (Oct. 24, 1980), Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 893, at 18-19 (Dec. 22, 1980). 
118 This prediction, of course, is based on limited information. It is also noteworthy that 
in 1972, the Rhode Island legislature repealed a statutory provision contained in the state 
employees bargaining statute that exempted matters exclusively reserved to the merit system 
from bargaining. R.I. GEN: LAws § 36-11-5 (repealed 1972). This repeal suggests that 
bargaining over matters covered by the merit system for state employees is required. 
119 See Local 1226, Rhinelander City Employees, AFSCME v. City of Rhinelander, 35 
Wis. 2d 209, 211, 215, 151 N.W.2d 30, 31, 33, 65 L.R.R.M. 2793, 2793, 2795 (1967). 
120 Id. at 220, 151 N.W.2d at 36, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2797. 
121 See Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n v. Teamsters Local 563, 75 Wis. 2d 
602, 612-14, 250 N.W.2d 696, 701-07, 94 L.R.R.M. 2840, 2844-45 (1977). 
122 See City of Madison v. Madison Professional Police Officers Ass'n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 
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that the discharge of probationary police officers was not arbitrable 
because arbitration would improperly transfer the statutory discre-
tion of the police chief to an arbitrator. 123 
Finally, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission 
("WERC") ruled that arbitrators were permitted to decide griev-
ances concerning discipline of deputy sheriffs despite the existence 
of a county civil service system with a grievance board established 
by ordinance.124 The WERC reconciled the statute and civil service 
ordinance by holding that an employee dissatisfied with the decision 
of the county grievance board could file a grievance under the 
collective bargaining agreement and proceed to arbitration or ap-
peal to the circuit court under civil service law.125 The Wisconsin 
approach, like that of many other courts and boards, first attempts 
to reconcile the conflicting laws without doing substantial damage 
to the purposes of either.126 The court determines priority. only in 
the event of an irreconcilable conflict. 
Although the Wisconsin law is not settled, these cases indicate 
that Wisconsin is willing to·, allow arbitration of discharge cases 
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements despite civil service 
appeals procedures, but is unwilling to permit the collective bar-
gaining agreement to contradict directly laws that establish grounds 
594-95, 425 N.W.2d 8, 15 (1988). In Madison, the court was faced with a challenge to an 
arbitration award based on the same residency ordinance that was at issue in Teamsters Local 
563. The court refused to vacate the award, finding no manifest disregard of the law 
particularly because the city had agreed to exceptions from the residency ordinance and the 
ordinance expressly contemplated exceptions. Id. at 594-95, 425 N.W.2d at 14-15. The court 
overruled Teamsters Local 563 to the extent that it held that an ordinance always prevails over 
a contract but noted that it was not making a broad exception to the general rule that the 
law takes precedence over a contract. Id. at 595, 425 N.W.2d at 15. 
12s See Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d 192, 197-98, 335 
N.W.2d 417, 419-20 (1983). The court rejected the argument that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court's earlier decision in Glendale Professional Policemen's Association v. Glendale, 83 Wis. 
2d 90, 264 N.W.2d 594 (1978), required the opposite conclusion. See Milwaukee Police Ass'n, 
113 Wis. 2d at 196, 335 N.W.2d at 419. The court in Glendale had held that a collective 
bargaining provision that required that promotions be made on the basis of seniority was 
lawful because it merely restricted the statutory discretion of the police chief. Id. The 
Milwaukee decision appears to be based, in part, on the purpose of the probationary period, 
which is to allow a trial period for the employee during which an unchallengeable right to 
discharge exists. 
124 See Dodge County and AFSCME Local 1323-B, Decision No. 21574 (WERC 1984). 
The decision was in response to a petition for a declaratory ruling filed by Dodge County. 
12s See Dodge County, Decision No. 21574, slip op. at 8. 
125 See, e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 175, 624 P.2d 1215, 1218, 
172 Cal. Rptr. 487, 490, 109 L.R.R.M. 2674, 2676 (1981); Wayne County Civil Serv. Comm'n 
v. Board of Supervisors, 384 Mich. 363, 373-74, 184 N.W.2d 201, 204-05, 77 L.R.R.M. 
2034, 2036-37 (1971). 
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for discharge. Thus, Wisconsin appears to distinguish between ne-
gotiation of disciplinary standards, which is not permitted where a 
statute providing standards or employer discretion to set standards 
exists, and negotiation of appeal procedures, which is permissible 
despite alternative avenues of appeal. 
States with silent statutes that have resolved the civil service/ 
collective bargaining conflict by permitting collective bargaining 
have relied on several factors. Firs·t, where the state later enacted 
the collective bargaining statute, some courts have presumed. that 
the legislature had knowledge of the potential conflict created with 
the civil service law, and intended the collective bargaining statute 
to prevail. 127 Second, some courts have reasoned that the compre-
hensiveness of the collective bargaining statute suggests that the 
legislature intended it to govern uniformly employer-employee re-
lationships, thus precluding interference with the statutory scheme 
by civil service law, which covers only a portion of the public em- ' 
ployees.128 Third, where the civil service system is permitted but not 
required, some courts have concluded that the legislature could not 
have intended it to prevail over a mandatory bargaining require-
ment.129 Finally, where there is no clear legal prohibition on nego-
tiation of disciplinary matters or grievance procedures in the civil 
service statute or decisions thereunder, bargaining has been per-
mitted.130 Courts have used similar factors in decisions in those 
states where no definitive resolution of the conflict has been 
reached. 131 
These decisions provide useful guidance for determining leg-
islative intent in the absence of statutory language, but they are not 
an adequate substitute for specific language addressing the prob-
lem. Because the conflict is common to most states, legislatures 
enacting collective bargaining laws should address the problem in 
the statute. A review of state statutory provisions dealing with the 
relationship of civil service and collective bargaining law provides 
useful guidance regarding the appropriate accommodation of'the 
two laws. 
127 See, e.g., Local 1383, IAFF v. City of Warren, 411 Mich. 642, 655-62, 311 N.W.2d 
702, 706-09 (1981); Wayne County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 384 Mich. at 373-74, 184 N.W.2d at 
204-05, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2036-37. 
12s See supra notes 92, 100 and accompanying text. 
129 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
1so See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
1s1 See supra notes 104, 106-09, 119-26 and accompanying text. 
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B. Specific Statutory Provisions Regarding Employee Discipline 
I. State Statutes that Expressly Address the Negotiation or 
Enforcement of Contract Provisions Regarding Employee 
Discipline 
117 
Statutory provisions specifically directed at employee discipline 
take two basic forms. The first type addresses the negotiability of 
disciplinary issues; the second contains provisions directed at 
whether civil service or contractual procedures govern disciplinary 
disputes. The Wisconsin statute covering state employees provides 
an example of both types. 132 The statute requires negotiation re-
garding a procedure for the adjustment of grievances or disputes 
arising out of any type of disciplinary action. 133 In addition to 
requiring negotiation about grievance procedures for discipline, the 
bargaining law further specifies that no negotiation is required 
about policies and procedures of the civil service commission relat-
ing to either specific subjects, 134 or certain types of disciplinary 
actions specified in one section of the civil service law-removal, 
suspension, discharge, reduction in pay, or demotion-except as 
provided in the civil service law. 135 The statutory civil service sections 
specify both that just cause is required for any of the above-men-
tioned disciplinary actions and that the determination of just cause 
is governed by the collective bargaining agreement and the appeal 
procedure required to be negotiated therein. 136 Thus, although 
bargaining over standards for serious disciplinary action is pre-
cluded, the statute effectively incorporates into the contract a just-
cause requirement for such discipline, the requirement that typically 
would be negotiated by the union. 137 Further, the law specifies that 
the contractual grievance procedure governs in lieu of any civil 
service appeals procedure.138 
The Nevada Local Government Employee-Management Rela-
tions Act provides another example of a specific provision on dis-
152 See Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 111.91 (West 1988). 
m See id. § ll l.9l(l)(b). 
1s4 See id. § ll l.91(2)(b). 
1ss See id. § ll l.91(2)(c). 
1ss See id. §§ 230.34(l)(a), (am), (ar), 230.44. 
1s1 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
1ss See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.34(l)(ar). 
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cipline negotiation.139 That statute expressly enumerates mandatory 
bargaining subjects, including discipline and discharge procedures, 
and grievance and arbitration procedures. 140 In New Mexico, col-
lective bargaining is authorized not directly by statute but by rules 
of the State Personnel Board, a creature of statute with authority 
to establish employment rules. 141 These rules prohibit negotiation 
of any agreement contrary to Board rules that govern, inter alia, 
dismissal and demotion procedure, 142 and further specify that the 
contractual grievance procedure cannot provide for arbitration of 
dismissals, demotions, or suspensions.143 Furthermore, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court stated in AFSCME, Local 2238 v. Stratton 
that the Board cannot delegate to unions and agencies the authority 
to agree on matters, including termination of employees, that are 
expressly committed to the Board's rulemaking authority. 144 Thus, 
Nevada and New Mexico have express provisions with opposite 
results. 
The New Jersey law explicitly requires negotiation of a written 
grievance and disciplinary review procedure, which may provide 
139 See NEV. REv. STAT. § 288.010-.280 (1990). Notably, the statute specifies that nego-
tiation over such matters is required but does not specifically address the issue of possibly 
conflicting civil service provisions on discipline or any other subject. Thus, the statute might 
be equally well classified as one that is silent with respect to the relationship between civil 
service and collective bargaining. See Helburn & Bennett, supra note 37, at 626. The Nevada 
Supreme Court has held, however, that the statutory requirement for negotiation of discipline 
and discharge procedures supersedes a contrary city charter. City of Reno v. Reno Police 
Protective Ass'n, 98 Nev. 472, 475, 653 P.2d 156, 158, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3424, 3426 
(1982). 
140 See NEv. REv. STAT. § 288.150(i), (o) (1990). In City of Reno, the Nevada Supreme 
Court held that the city must bargain with the union about discipline and discharge proce-
dures despite the fact that the city's charter declared them nonnegotiable. 98 Nev. at 475, 
653 P.2d at 158, 112 L.R.R.M. at 3426. The court based its decision on the priority of the 
statute over contrary charter provisions, relying on a prior decision to that effect. Notably, 
the statute does not list disciplinary standards as a negotiable bargaining subject. 
141 See State Personnel Board, Regulations for Labor-Management Relations (1983), 4A Lab. 
Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Lab. Arb. No. 749, at 41:207) (Jan. 15, 1990). The State Personnel Board's 
authority to permit bargaining has withstood legal challenge. Local 2238, AFSCME v. Strat-
ton, 108 N.M. 163, 171, 769 P.2d 76, 84, 131 L.R.R.M. 2424, 2431 (1989). 
142 See Stratton, 108 N.M. at 169, 769 P.2d at 82, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2429. 
143 See State Personnel Board, Regulations for Labor-Management Relations, at 41:208e. 
The New Mexico rules are a hybrid in a sense because they contain both the cited specific 
prohibition on negotiability of discharge arbitration, and a general prohibition on negotiation 
of any proposal inconsistent with a Board rule. See supra note 141-42 and accompanying 
text. These rules would place New Mexico in the category of states with general provisions 
about conflict of laws as well. See infra notes 174-239 and accompanying text. 
144 108 N.M. at 169, 769 P.2d at 82, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2429. The court also stated, 
however, that collective bargaining is not incompatible with the merit system. Id. at 170, 769 
P.2d at 83, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2431. 
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for binding arbitration, but further specifies that the procedure can 
neither replace nor be inconsistent with any statutory appeal pro-
cedu_re, nor can it provide for binding arbitration of disciplinary 
disputes where the employees have protection under civil service 
or tenure laws.145 Courts and the New Jersey Public Employee 
Relations Commission have interpreted this provision to preclude 
negotiation over any proposal relating to discipline that is covered 
by the Civil Service Act or regulations of the Civil Service Commis-
sion, including both arbitration of discipline and standards for dis-
cipline.146 
The second type of express statutory provision addressing the 
discipline issues specifies whether the collective bargaining agree-
ment or the civil service provisions govern disciplinary disputes. 147 
145 See N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West 1988). 
146 See State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 NJ. 54, 89-90, 393 A.2d 233, 
246, 98 L.R.R.M. 3267, 3277-78 (1978) (negotiation of matters set by statute or regulation 
is precluded, as is negotiation of proposals that would interfere with the discretion of the 
civil service commission); State v. Local 195, IFPTE, 179 N.J. Super. 146, 153-54, 430 A.2d 
966, 970 (1981) (the Civil Service Act has preempted the disciplinary determinations of state 
employees and neither the standards for discipline nor a grievance and arbitration procedure 
for challenging discipline is negotiable); City of Newark, 12 NJPER 11 17010 (1985) (a 
proposed grievance provision that would permit firefighters to elect binding arbitration to 
challenge disciplinary decisions where statutory civil service remedies are available is not 
negotiable). See Comment, After Ridgefield Park and State Supervisory Employees: The Scope 
of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector of New Jersey, 10 SETON HALL L. REv. 558, 571-84 
(1980), for a discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State Supervisory 
Employees Association, and its effect on the scope of bargaining in New Jersey. Legislation 
other than civil service also may preempt negotiation of disciplinary matters in New Jersey. 
See City of Jersey City v. Jersey City Police Officers' Benevolent Ass'n, 179 N.J. Super. 137, 
138, 430 A.2d 961, 962 (1981) (disciplinary penalties for police officers are not negotiable 
or arbitrable because the legislature has delegated disciplinary discretion to the municipality). 
It is not altogether clear whether minor disciplinary actions that are not covered by civil 
service or delegated to a municipality by statute are negotiable. Compare Local 195, 179 N.J. 
Super. at 152, 430 A.2d at 969 (discipline is a managerial prerogative that is not negotiable) 
with City of Newark, 12NJPER1117010, slip op. at 28 (a proposal that would allow firefighters 
to choose binding arbitration to challenge discipline where no civil service procedure is 
available is negotiable) and State of New Jersey, II NJPER 1116026 (1984) (minor disciplinary 
decision not appealable to the Civil Service Commission may be submitted to binding arbi-
tration). 
147 In addition to the states mentioned in the discussion below-Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, Delaware, and Oregon-other states have statutory provisions of this type. See, e.g., VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § I 734(b) (1987) (for municipal employees, if an employer and employee 
organization voluntarily submit a grievance over tenure of employment to binding arbitration, 
with or without a collective bargaining agreement, binding arbitration is the exclusive method 
of resolution regardless of contrary statutory provisions). In all other situations, state laws, 
municipal charters, and special acts prevail over conflicting provisions of collective bargaining 
agreements. Id. tit. 6, § I 725(c). This latter provision would appear to govern disputes over 
discipline that do not affect tenure of employment, to the extent that such laws cover lesser 
discipline. See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (1988) (for public employees other than 
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The Massachusetts labor relations statute permits the parties to 
negotiate a grievance procedure ending in binding arbitration.148 If 
an employee elects to use such a procedure, it is the exclusive 
method (or resolving any dispute over suspension and dismissal 
notwithstanding the existing civil service procedure. 149 Minnesota 
not only permits but requires the parties to negotiate such a pro-
cedure for all <lisciplinary actions. 150 Employees who have other 
appeals procedures available, including civil service appeals, may 
opt Sor the contractual procedure or the appeals procedure but 
cannot pursue both. 151 
Delaware addresses the issue in the civil service statute rather 
than the collective bargaining statute, listing certain rules of the 
Civil Service Commission that apply to employees covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements, regardless of the provisions of the 
agreement, 152 and other rules that may be preempted by contractual 
clauses on the subject.153 Rules adopted pursuant to the statutory 
provisions on discharge and reduction in rank or grade for just 
cause154 and grievances155 are in the latter category, and thus ne-
gotiations about those subjects are required. 156 The Oregon civil 
service statute covering state employ~es addresses this issue in a 
similar manner. It states that, notwithstanding certain statutory pro-
visions, one of which addresses discipline of civil service employees, 
the terms and conditions of employment for employees in bargain-
state employees if the contract provides for arbitration of disciplinary actions, such provisions 
are controlling in the event of conflict ~vith civil service. Civil service jurisdiction is reserved 
with respect to other subjects such as conduct and grading of exams, rating of candidates, 
and establishment oflists); D.C. CODE ANN.§§ l-617.3(d), 1-617.l(b) (1981) (the grievance 
procedure in the collective bargaining agreement takes precedence over the civil service 
grievance procedure and any adverse action under the collective bargaining agreement may 
only be for cause). 
• 
148 See M.,.ss. GEN. L. ch.150E, § 8 (1988). 
149 Id. 
150 See MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 179A.20 (West Supp. 1990). 
151 Id. 
152 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5938(c) (1983). 
m See id. § 5938(d). The provisions probably are contained in the civil service law rather 
than the collective bargaining law because, in contrast to most states, the civil service law in 
Delaware was enacted after the collective bargaining law. See supra note 52 and accompanying 
text. 
154 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5930 (1983). 
155 See id. § 5931. 
156 See id. § 5938(b); Sullivan v. Local Union 1726, AFSCME, 464 A.2d 899, 901-03, 
115 L.R.R.M. 3179, 3181-82 (Del. 1983); Laborers' Int'! Union of North America, Local 
1029 v. State Dep't of Health & Social Services, 310 A.2d 664, 666-67, 84 L.R.R.M. 2417, 
2417-19 (Del. Ch. 1973), aff'd, 314 A.2d 919, 85 L.R.R.M. 2303 (Del. 1974). 
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ing units with a recognized or certified union representative will be 
determined by the collective bargaining agreement, not by civil 
service law or regulations. 157 The Oregon statute also states that 
employment disputes for these employees will be resolved using the 
contractual grievance procedure.158 
2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Express Statutory Provisions 
Regarding Employee Discipline 
The above-mentioned statutory provisions illustrate several 
methods of reconciling civil service and bargaining requirements. 
Addressing the negotiability of disciplinary matters using specific 
statutory language offers the advantage of clarity of purpose, 
thereby minimizing the necessity for litigation. Litigation over bar-
gaining subjects delays negotiations and the salutary effects of 
peaceful resolution of disputes between the bargaining parties, one 
of the primary goals of bargaining laws.159 Where uncertainty exists 
over whether negotiation is required, a recalcitrant negotiator, or <!. 
negotiator legitimately concerned about potential infringement on 
civil service prerogatives, may use the uncertainty to prolong ne-
gotiations through disputes over bargainability. 160 The result may 
well be a time-consuming and expensive round of litigation, 161 fol-
lowed by court-ordered bargaining between parties embittered by 
an unnecessary court battle. 162 
Express statutory provisions, however, do not always provide 
the expected certainty. For example, the Nevada statute requires 
negotiation about discipline and discharge procedures, and griev-
ance and arbitration procedures.163 It does not indicate whether the 
standards for discipline are negotiable. An employee organization 
could argue plausibly that negotiation of procedures implies nego-
tiation of standards because an arbitrator limited to interpreting 
the contract in deciding a grievance challenging discipline must 
have contractual standards to apply. The employer could argue with 
equal force that legislative enumeration of the subjects of negotia-
151 See OR. REv. STAT. § 240.321(2), (3) (1987). 
15s See id. § 240.321(4). 
159 See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text for a description of goals of bargaining 
laws. 
160 See Edwards, supra note 1, at 914. 
161 Id. 
152 Negotiations may be further complicated by the frustrations of employees whose 
expected gains from collective bargaining have been long delayed. 
16s See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. 
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tion requires the conclusion that bargaining is not required with 
respect to subjects not mentioned, relying on the axiom of statutory 
interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 164 The employer 
could contend that standards under the civil service statute apply; 
the union could argue with substantial scholarly support that an 
arbitrator may not be permitted to consider civil service rules that 
are not incorporated in the contract because the arbitrator's au-
thority is limited to interpreting and apply~ng the collective bar-
gaining agreement. 165 
Other statutory provisions discussed above, such as those of 
Minnesota and Massachusetts, 166 pose similar problems by specify-
ing negotiation over procedure. The Wisconsin and District of Co-
lumbia statutes avoid this problem by imposing a just-cause limita-
tion in the contract by statute.167 Although statutory imposition of 
standards interferes with the goal of giving the parties the freedom 
to determine terms and conditions of employment through bar-
gaining, the interference is probably slight because the just-cause 
limitation is common where standards are negotiated. 168 
Similar problems of interpretation have occurred in Delaware 
where the law defines negotiability by reference to rules derived 
from sections of the civil service statute. In Sullivan v. Local 1726, 
AFSCME, the Delaware Supreme Court was required to decide the 
statutory derivation of a particular civil service rule regarding em-
ployment transfers in order to determine whether the issue was 
negotiable. 169 Although this may not pose a problem with discipli-
nary actions where the statutory derivation is clear, it does create 
difficulty for other areas of civil service/collective bargaining con-
flict. Thus, express statutory language offers certain advantages but 
also may create problems. 
If the legislature specifies that bargaining over a particular topic 
is or is not required, it creates an inference regarding the negotia-
bility of subjects not mentioned. A party desiring to avoid negotia-
164 To express one thing is to exclude others. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 
67, at 355. For examples of application of this rule of construction, see People ex rel. Difanis 
v. Barr, 83 III. 2d 191, 199, 414 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1980); In re Estate of Leichtenberg, 7 111. 
2d 545, 552, 131 N.E.2d 487, 490 (1956). 
165 See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 67, at 214, 366-80; 0. FAIRWEATHER, 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION, 436-68 (2d ed. 1983). 
166 See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text. 
167 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-617.1, l-617.3(d) (1981); Wis. STAT. §§ 111.91, 
230.34(l)(a), (am), (ar) (1988 & Supp. 1989). 
168 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
169 464 A.2d 899, 901, 115 L.R.R.M. 3179, 3181 (Del. 1983). 
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tions may reasonably argue that a statutory mandate to bargain 
about discipline indicates a legislative intent to preclude bargaining 
on subjects not discussed in the statute. Similarly, statutory preclu-
sion of disciplinary bargaining lends itself to a contention that it is 
the only subject excluded from negotiations. Statutory recitation of 
bargaining subjects is workable only in the unlikely event that the 
legislature can be certain that all possible subjects are enumerated 
and placed in the desired category. Even in that event, statutory 
enumeration of bargaining subjects has the considerable disadvan-
tage of restricting the flexibility of both the parties and the agency 
administering the statute to adjust the subjects negotiated to the 
changing demands of the work place over time. 170 
The two different statutory approaches discussed above ad-
dress different but related aspects of the conflict problem. The first 
method deals with the scope of negotiability, i.e., whether the law 
requires the parties to bargain about discipline standards and pro-
cedures. The second deals with the enforceability question, i.e., 
assuming that the parties have negotiated contract language dealing 
with discipline, whether the contract is enforceable. The two issues 
are interrelated, but a statute that does not address both may give 
rise to litigation. Where the collective bargaining statute clearly 
requires bargaining, an employer or a union may negotiate a pro-
vision and later claim that it is unenforceable because of a conflict 
with civil service law. 171 If the statute contains no language indicat-
ing whether the contract or the civil service law has priority, a court 
,might find the contract to be unenforceable. A court might well 
conclude that, although negotiation was permissible, enforcing the 
provision over the objection of one of the parties would deprive the 
party of rights under the civil service law. The better view, however, 
absent direct legislative history to the contrary, is that, by author-
izing negotiation over the subject, the legislature empowered the 
parties to agree to an enforceable contract notwithstanding civil 
service law. Where bargaining over discipline is prohibited by the 
statute, there is a strong argument against enforceability of contracts 
negotiated contrary to the prohibition. The legislature's probable 
motivation in that instance is to preserve the jurisdiction of civil 
service over the matter. 
170 Edwards, supra note l, at 916-17 (quoting NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner, 
356 U.S. 342, 358-59 (1957)). 
171 See, e.g., Pittsburgh joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 
66, 69, 391 A.2d 1318, 3120, 99 L.R.R.M. 3278, 3279 (1978). 
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Similarly, where the statute contains a rule of precedence, but 
no express requirement that the parties negotiate over the issue, 
one party may refuse to negotiate based on the coverage of the 
subject by civil service law because a rule of precedence does not 
directly mandate or prohibit bargaining.172 In theory, a legislature 
could provide that the collective bargaining agreement takes pre-
cedence over civil service, while permitting but not requiring ne-
gotiation regarding subjects covered by civil service. Where the 
description of bargainable subjects is broad,173 however, and no 
limitation based on civil service is suggested in the statutory lan-
guage or legislative history, the logical conclusion is that the legis-
lature intended to require bargaining over subjects covered by civil 
service. Similarly, if the legislature provides that civil service laws 
supersede the collective bargaining agreement, the argqment that 
bargaining over civil service subjects is required but that the agree-
ment is unenforceable is a weak one. 
To avoid these problems of interpretation, the legislature 
should address both the scope of bargaining and the enforceability 
of the agreement as they relate to civil service laws. This may be 
done either by explicit provisions regarding particular subjects as 
in the states discussed above, or by more general provisions regard-
ing the relationship of collective bargaining requirements and other 
existing laws. 
C. Statutory Provisions Regarding the Relationship of Collective 
Bargaining to Other Laws 
1. State Statutes with Language Directed to the Relationship of 
Collective Bargaining to Other Laws 
In contrast to the state laws discussed above, which contain 
specific provisions regarding the negotiability and/or enforceability 
of discipline issues, many state laws contain broader provisions. 
Some states directly address the relationship of civil service law to 
172 See Edwards, supra note 1, at 910-11. 
173 Most public sector statutes use broad language to describe bargainable subjects. See, 
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1607 (Smith-Hurd 1986); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 150E, § 6 
(1988). Indeed, many are patterned after the National Labor Relations Act, which requires 
bargaining over "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment," 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d) (1988), language that has been broadly interpreted. See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 
170 F.2d 247, 253-54 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). 
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collective bargaining; 174 others contain general language about the 
relationship of other laws to collective bargaining.175 In order to 
determine whether the parties can negotiate discipline and enforce 
contract language relating to disciplinary issues, this general lan-
guage must be applied to specific situations. In many states, agency 
and/or court decisions have addressed and decided th~ negotiability 
an.d enforceability of contractual disciplinary provisions based on 
the general language of the statute. 
As in the case of laws with specific language regarding disci-
pline, statutes in this second category address the relationship of 
collective bargaining to other laws using different language. Certain 
states address the question in terms of the scope of required bar-
gaining; others contain provisions that deal with enforceability of 
contracts. 176 In addition, some states in this category have incor-
porated language dealing with both negotiability and enforceabil-
ity.111 
The Vermont State Employees Labor Relations Act offers an 
example of a provision directed at bargaining subjects. The law 
requires bargaining on all aspects of the relationship of the em-
ployer and employees except matters prescribed or controlled by 
statute.178 The act further states that it shall not be construed to "be 
in derogation of, or to contravene the spirit and intent of the merit 
system principles and personnel laws,"179 and requires the manage-
ment bargaining representative to ensure the compatibility of col-
lective bargaining with the merit system. 180 The Vermont statute 
also expressly prohibits the state police from negotiating about mat-
ters of discipline, but contains no such prohibition for other state 
employees. 181 Thus, the Vermont state employees statute contains 
both general conflict provisions and specific provisions regarding 
174 See infra notes 178-82, 185-91, 194-96, 198, 207, 220-21, 223-25, 227-28, 233-35 
and accompanying text. 
175 See infra notes 178, 183, 195-\)6, 199-200, 204-05, 214 and accompanying text. 
176 Compare CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-272(d) (West 1988) with TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. 
ANN. art. 5154e-l, § 20 (Vernon 1987). Alaska fits in neither category. The Alaska Public 
Employment Relations Act ("PERA") refers to civil service law only in the initial policy section, 
stating that the policy of the bargaining law is to strengthen the merit principle where civil 
service is in effect, and further provides that the policies of the PERA are to be effectuated 
by maintaining merit system principles. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.070 (1984). 
177 See infra notes 188-223 and accompanying text. 
178 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 904 (1985). 
119 Id. 
180 See id. § 905. 
181 See id. § 1004. 
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civil service, both in the context of subjects for bargaining. 182 Like 
the Vermont law, the Nebraska statute covering state employees 
requires bargaining over terms and conditions of employment, in-
cluding those that may otherwise be provided by law, unless nego-
tiation is specifically prohibited.183 There are no published court 
decisions officially interpreting the Vermont or Nebraska laws as 
they apply to discipline.184 
The Connecticut statute covering state employees also ad-
dresses the issue in terms of bargaining subjects, but specifically 
directs its provisions at conflict with civil service law. The statute 
requires bargaining about wages, hours, and other conditions of 
employment with an express reservation regarding certain civil ser-
vice subjects. 185 Specifically, no bargaining is required about the 
"establishment, conduct and grading of merit examinations, the 
rating of candidates and the establishment of lists from such ex-
amination and the appointments from such lists," and the enum-
erated matters are reserved expressly for the civil service agencies 
established by law.186 By expressly excluding these matters of civil 
service, the legislature has indicated that bargaining over other 
subjects covered by civil service law is permitted. In New Hamp-
182 The Maine statute governing state employees has provisions very similar to those of 
the Vermont State Employees Labor Relations Act. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-
D (West 1988 & 1989 Special Pamphlet). The Maine statute further provides that, if the 
parties negotiate a grievance procedure with binding arbitration, it is exclusive and supersedes 
any grievance procedure othenvise provided by law. Id. § 979-K. In Department of Education 
and Cultural Service v. Maine State Employees Association, the Maine Supreme Court held that 
this statutory provision and the collective bargaining agreement required binding arbitration 
of a discharge grievance, and precluded submission of the grievance to the State Employees' 
Appeals Board. 433 A.2d 415, 419, 1112 L.R.R.M. 3162, 3165 (1981). 
18s See NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1371(8) (1987). 
184 In In re Brooks, however, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the 
Vermont Labor Relations Board ("VLRB") on a grievance filed by a discharged state em-
ployee. 135 Vt. 563, 564, 382 A.2d 204, 205, 97 L.R.R.M. 2432, 2433 (1977). Under the 
Vermont statute, the VLRB makes the final determination on grievances of state employees. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 926 (Supp. 1989). The court in Brooks overturned the VLRB's decision 
reinstating the employee, but stated that the union and the employer could alter the definition 
of just cause in their collective bargaining agreement. 135 Vt. at 569, 382 A.2d at 208, 97 
L.R.R.M. at 2435. Clearly, the court has recognized that state employers and unions can 
negotiate about disciplinary standards and procedures. The court has limited the VLRB's 
review of employer disciplinary decisions. See, e.g., Grievance of Byrne, 147 Vt. 265, 268, 
514 A.2d 709, 711 (1986). For a thorough discussion of the VLRB's role in grievance 
proceedings for state employees and the Vermont Supreme Court's limitations on that role, 
see Note, The Vermont Labor Relations Board's Role in Grievance Proceedings: Let's Make This 
Process Work, 12 VT. L. REv. 429, 429-48 (1987). 
185 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-272(c), (d) (West 1988). 
186 Id. § 5-272(d). 
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shire, however, which has very similar statutory language, the stat-
ute has been construed to preclude negotiation over employee dis-
cipline and removal.187 
Other state statutes contain similar provisions regarding sub-
jects for negotiation and, in addition, language regarding enforce-
aqility of the contract. For example, the Hawaii bargaining law 
excludes certain subjects from negotiation altogether and prohibits 
agreement to any proposal inconsistent with the merit principle.188 
The statute further specifies that existing civil service regulations 
not contrary to the bargaining law remain applicable, but provides 
that the collective bargaining agreement prevails over inconsistent 
rules and regulations as long as the agreement is consistent with 
merit principles.189 
The Connecticut municipal employees bargaining law contains 
the same language as the Connecticut state employees law regarding 
subjects for negotiation.190 It also provides that the collective bar-
gaining agreement has precedence over charters, special acts, or-
dinances, and rules or regulations of the civil service commission 
or the employer, provided that the appropriate legislative body of 
the employer has approved the agreement. 191 The Connecticut Su-
preme Court has interpreted these provisions of the law to require 
negotiation over a proposal for binding arbitration of discharge 
grievances of police officers and to permit enforcement of such a 
clause, despite a city charter provision that authorized the police 
commissioners to discharge employees for cause in accordance with 
187 See State Employees' Ass'n v. New Hampshire Pub. Employee Labor Relations Bd., 
118 N.H. 885, 889-90, 397 A.2d 1035, 1037-38, 100 L.R.R.M. 2484, 2486 (1978) (inter-
preting N.H. RE.v. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:3.III (1987)). The court based its decision on both 
the merit system exclusion, which was contained in language very similar to that in the 
Connecticut statute, and the statutory management rights clause. Id. at 889-90, 397 A.2d at 
1038, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2486. 
1s8 See HAW. RE.v. STAT. § 89-9(d) (1988). Excluded from bargaining are classification 
and reclassification, retirement benefits, and salary ranges and steps. 
189 See id. § 89-lO(d). In Matter of Yamaguchi and Malapit, Decision No. 145 (Haw. 
Pub. Emp. Relations Bd. 1981), the Board held that the Mayor of the County of Kauai and 
the Public Workers Union violated the statute by settling a promotion grievance in a manner 
that had no contractual basis and was inconsistent with civil service law. The effect of the 
settlement was to deprive the complainant of a job to which he was entitled on the basis of 
civil service law. The Board's decision was based on the settlement's inconsistency with merit 
principles. 
190 See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. The municipal law also contains 
additional limitations on negotiation of the promotional process and charter provisions 
concerning employee political activity. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(g) (West 1989). 
191 See id. § 7-474(b). 
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civil service rules. 192 The court correctly noted that there might well 
be no conflict with the charter because the charter did not prohibit 
additional proceedings to challenge discharges but, in any event, 
the law gave the contract priority over the charter if any conflict 
existed. 193 
Ohio has exclusions in subjects for negotiation similar to those 
of Connecticut194 and further provides that the bargaining law and 
agreements negotiated thereunder prevail over other laws, except 
as otherwise specified by the legislature.195 Neither the bargaining 
statute nor the civil service statute precludes negotiation over dis-
cipline, and indeed, the bargaining law states that the civil service 
commission has no jurisdiction over a grievance if a contract pro-
vides for final and binding arbitration of the matter that is the 
subject of the grievance. 196 Thus, the civil service commission may 
not entertain appeals regarding such grievances.197 
The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act has provisions re-
garding both negotiability and enforceability, but the courts have 
reached a different result with respect to bargaining over discipli-
nary issues than the Connecticut courts. Like Connecticut, Iowa 
confirms that nothing in the statute "shall diminish the authority 
and power" of any civil service commission to recruit, prepare, 
conduct and grade examinations, to rate candidates for appoint-
ment and promotion, to classify employees, and to provide appeal 
192 See Board of Police .Comm'rs v. White, 171 Conn. 553, 563-65, 370 A.2d 1070, 
1075-76, 93 L.R.R.M. 2637, 2640-41 (1976). 
193 Id. at 563-64, 370 A.2d at 1075, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2640. 
194 See OHIO REv. CoDE ANN.§ 4117.08(B) (Baldwin 1983) ("The conduct and grading 
of civil service examinations, the rating of candidates, the establishment of eligible lists from 
the examinations, and the original appointments from the eligible lists are not appropriate 
subjects for collective bargaining."). The language of the statute suggests that the legislature 
intended to allow broad scope for negotiations. W. Celley, Scope of Bargaining Issues ill Ohio's 
Public Sector, 14 Omo N.U.L. REv. 21, 27 (1987). 
195 See Omo REv. CoDE ANN.§ 4117.10 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). In Stale ex rel. Rolins v. 
Board of Education, the Ohio Supreme Court, interpreting this section of the statute, held 
that the collective bargaining agreement prevailed over the conflicting statute governing 
teacher tenure. 40 Ohio St. 3d 123, 124-25, 532 N.E.2d 1289, 1291 (1988). The decision 
narrowly interprets the exceptions to preemption of other laws by the collective bargaining 
agreement, indicating substantial deference to the collective bargaining process. See id. at 
126-27, 532 N.E.2d at 1292-93. 
196 See OHIO REv. CoDE ANN.§ 4117.10 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). 
197 See id. In Richards v. State Personnel Board of Review, an Ohio appeals court affirmed 
the dismissal of an appeal to the State Personnel Board of Review of a probationary em-
ployee's discharge on the ground that the Ohio Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act 
deprived the Board of jurisdiction where a negotiated arbitration procedure existed. CA-
3393 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1989) (LEXIS 463). 
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rights. 198 Unlike Ohio and Connecticut, however, which give the 
collective bargaining law (Ohio) or contracts negotiated thereunder 
(Connecticut) priority, Iowa law provides that no collective bargain-
ing agreement or arbitration decision is enforceable if enforcement 
would "substantially impair or limit performance of any statutory 
duty of the employer,"199 and further specifies that the state statutes 
prevail over conflicting contract language.200 Although the statute 
also provides that the grievance procedure of a contract should be 
followed rather than the existing statutory appeals procedures, 201 
the Iowa Supreme Court held in Devine v. City of Des Moines that 
the statutory priority language and the civil service law that states, 
in pertinent part, "[n]o person holding civil service rights as pro-
vided in this chapter shall be removed, demoted, or suspended 
arbitrarily, except as otherwise provided in this chapter," required 
the conclusion that the civil service commission has exclusive juris-
diction over discharges, and a contractual arbitration provision was 
deemed unenforceable.202 
Like the Connecticut and Ohio statutes, the Illinois Public La-
bor Relations Act ("IPLRA")203 has provisions on both negotiability 
and enforceability. The IPLRA provisions are more similar to those 
in the Nebraska state employees law, however, because they are 
directed at conflict of law in general, rather than civil service law in 
particular. The IPLRA imposes an obligation to bargain over any 
condition of employment not specifically provided for in any other 
law and not specifically in violation of any other law. 204 The statute 
further provides that both the IPLRA and collective bargaining 
agreements negotiated thereunder supersede conflicting laws. 205 
The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to require 
bargaining over a proposal that would allow employees to arbitrate 
19s IowA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West 1989). 
199 Id.§ 20.17. 
200 Id. § 20.28. See City of Davenport and AFSCME Council 61, Case No. 2535 (Iowa 
Pub. Emp. Relations Bd. 1983) for a discussion by the Iowa Public Employmei:it Relations 
Board of the applicability of this provision to the conflict between civil service and bargaining 
requirements. 
201 See lowA CoDE ANN. § 20.18 (West 1989). 
202 366 N.W.2d 580, 582-83, 122 L.R.R.M. 3109, 3110-11(Iowa1985). 
20s ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1601-27 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1990). The Illinois 
Public Labor Relations Act covers state and local government employees except for educa-
tional employees who are covered by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act. Id. paras. 
1701-20. 
204 See id. para. 1607. 
205 Id. para. 1615. 
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disciplinary grievances, despite a municipal civil service system that 
provided a discipline appeal procedure. 20s 
The Washington bargaining law provides a variation on the 
above theme, absolving the employer of any bargaining obligation 
in matters delegated to a civil service commission similar in scope 
and authority to that created by statute for state employees.207 The 
Public Employee Relations Commission generally has concluded 
that local civil service commissions are not sufficiently similar to the 
state commission to excuse bargaining by local government em-
ployers. 208 The Washington statute also specifies that its provisions 
206 See City of Decatur v. AFSCME, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 365-67, 522 N.E.2d 
1219, 1224-25 (1988). The decision in Decatur was based on section 1607, which defines the 
subjects of bargaining. See id. at 358-59, 522 N.E.2d at 1221. See supra note 204 and 
accompanying text. 
207 See WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 41.56.100 (Supp. 1990). The status of bargaining for 
state employees in Washington is a matter "of some complication" under the Washington 
statute. Ortblad v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 109, 114, 530 P.2d 635, 639, 88 L.R.R.M. 3402, 3404 
(1975) (en bane). Citing various provisions of the bargaining statute, the Washington Supreme 
Court held in Ortblad that state employees have a right to collective bargaining. Id. at 114-
15, 530 P.2d at 639, 88 L.R.R.M. at 3404-05. Later that same year, the court held that 
juvenile court employees were state employees who were not covered by the collective 
bargaining statute with respect to hiring, firing, and working conditions for which the juvenile 
court judges had responsibility, and therefore, the collective bargaining agreement with the 
county governing those matters was void. Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 748, 750, 539 
P.2d 823, 826, 827, 90 L.R.R.M. 2832, 2834-35 (1975) (en bane). 
The state civil service statute authorizes the State Personnel Board to adopt rules re· 
garding the basis and procedures for reducing, dismissing, suspending, or demoting an 
employee, WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 41.06.150(1) (Supp. 1990), and "[a]greemcnts between 
agencies and certified exclusive bargaining representatives providing for grievance proce-
dures and collective negotiations on all personnel matters over which the appointing authority 
of the appropriate bargaining unit may lawfully exercise discretion." Id. § 41.06.150(13). 
This statutory provision, contained in the civil service statute, is also referenced in the 
collective bargaining statute. See id. § 41.56.130. The unfair labor practice portions of the 
bargaining statute arc incorporated by the civil service statute. See id. § 41.06.340. The rules 
of the State Personnel Board require that each contract contain a grievance procedure with 
arbitration by the State Personnel Board. See Kerr v. Department of Game, 14 Wash. App. 
427, 430, 542 P.2d 467, 469 (1975). Although the law regarding state employees is complex, 
as noted in Ortblad, a right to collective bargaining clearly exists. With respect to the rela-
tionship between collective bargaining and civil service, the civil service statute would appear 
to authorize bargaining only where the employer has discretion over a particular personnel 
matter. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 41.06.150(13) (Supp. 1990). Where the civil service law 
or any other statute restricts the employer's discretion, bargaining would be precluded. See 
id.; see also Ortblad, where the court held that the state budget director was the employer who 
must bargain with the union representing state employees on the subject of wages because 
he had discretion. 85 Wash. 2d at 115-16, 530 P.2d at 639-40, 88 L.R.R.M. at 3405. In 
Ortblad II, however, the court held that the director was not authorized to enter into a binding 
agreement. Ortblad v. Washington, 88 Wash. 2d 380, 383, 561 P.2d 201, 203, 95 L.R.R.M. 
2114, 2115 (1977) (en bane). 
208 See IAFF, Local 1890 and City of Wenatchee, Decision 2216 (PECB, 1985); City of 
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are additional to other remedies and supersede conflicting stat-
utes. 209 This section has been interpreted to require an employer 
to arbitrate a discharge grievance where the contract g~ve the em-
ployee a choice between the contractual procedure and the civil 
service appeals procedure.2 1° 
Another group of states in this category address the issue 
through statutory and collective bargaining agreement priority pro-
visions, with varying results.211 The Illinois Educational Labor Re-
lations Act212 and the Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act213 
contain language stating that the parties shall not effect or imple-
ment contract provisions in violation of or inconsistent with other 
statutes. 214 These provisions attempt to address both negotiability 
and enforceability by barring the parties from both effecting and 
implementing conflicting contractual provisions.215 Courts in both 
states have addressed the applicability of the statutes to discharge 
cases. In Board of Governors v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations 
Board,216 the Illinois Appellate Court held that civil service law did 
not establish the exclusive remedy for discharge and that the em-
ployer violated the law by refusing to process a discharge grievance 
to arbitration.217 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took a different 
approach in Pittsburgh] oint Collective Bargaining Committee v. City of 
Walla Walla, Decision 1999 and 1999-A (PECB, 1984); City of Bellevue, Decision 839 (PECB, 
1980). . 
209 See WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 41.56.905 (Supp. 1990). 
210 See Rose v. Erikson, 106 Wash. 2d 420, 421, 721 P.2d 969, 970 (1986) (en bane). 
211 These states include Kansas, California (state and local government employees), 
Florida, Illinois (educational employees), Pennsylvania, and Texas (police and firefighters). 
See infra notes 212-39 and accompanying text. States that have statutes containing both 
negotiability provisions and priority provisions were discussed previously. See supra notes 
188-210 and accompanying text. 
212 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1701-20 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1990). The statute 
covers educational employees only. See supra note 203. 
213 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-2301 (Purdon Supp. 1990). 
214 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1710(b) (Smith-Hurd 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 
§ 1101.703 (Purdon Supp. 1990). The Pennsylvania statute prohibits conflict with municipal 
home rule charters as well. 
215 The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board has narrowly interpreted the pro-
hibition on effecting provisions in conflict with other statutes, requiring negotiations on 
matters within the exclusive authority of the statutory merit board but prohibiting their 
implementation without merit board approval. See AFSCME and Board of Trustees, Uni-
versity of Illinois, Case No. 86-CA-0087-C (1989). 
216 170 Ill. App. 3d 463, 524 N.E.2d 758 (1988). 
217 See id. at 478, 483, 524 N.E.2d at 764, 770. The court's decision relied, in part, on 
statutory language that allows the parties to supplement but not diminish employee rights 
under other statutes. See id. at 478-80, 524 N.E.2d at 766-67; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 
1710(b) (Smith-Hurd 1986). 
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Pittsburgh.218 Without deciding whether a conflict between the con-
tract and civil service law existed, the court held that an employer 
could not agree to arbitrate discharges and then refuse to arbitrate 
based on allegedly conflicting civil service law.219 
The Texas police and firefighter bargaining law preempts all 
contrary laws, and collective bargaining agreements are expressly 
permitted to preempt civil service law.220 Where the agreement 
contains no provision preempting civil service law, civil service gov-
erns. 221 Relying on this language, the Texas Appellate Court has 
voided disciplinary proceedings of the civil service commission 
where contractual requirements, which were given priority by the 
collective bargaining agreement, were not followed. 222 In contrast, 
the Kansas statute bars the contract from covering subjects 
21s 48I Pa. 66, 39I A.2d I3I8, 99 L.R.R.M. 3278 (I978). 
219 See id. at 70-7I, 39I A.2d at I320, 99 L.R.R.M. at 3279-80. The Pennsylvania courts 
have narrowly construed other statutes to avoid conflicts that would preclude arbitration of 
discharges. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Franklin Township Municipal San· 
itary A:uth., 39 Pa. Commw. IO, I5, 395 A.2d 606, 608, 100 L.R.R.M. 2I86, 2I87 (1978) (no 
statutory directive "expressly commanding that the authorities and authorities alone exercise 
the power to appoint and dismiss employees at will unfettered by a review of arbitration 
under a PERA contract"); Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers Local No. 3, 
464 Pa. 92, 96, 97, IOI, 346'A.2d 35, 37, 40, 90 L.R.R.M. 2879, 2880, 2882 (I975) (statutory 
authority to ·remove teachers for specified causes and to establish rules and regulations does 
not preclude contractual arbitration of the discharges of nontenured teachers); AFSCME 
Local I59 v. -City of Philadelphia, Docket No. PERA-C-88-222-E (Pennsylvania Labor 
Relations Bd. I98'9) (civil service regulations cannot supersede the employer's statutory 
obligation to comply with an arbitration award). 
220 See TEX. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 5I54c-I, § 20 (Vernon I987). Similarly, the law 
governing employees of the Maryland National Park and Planning Commission covers a 
limited group of employees and expressly permits contractual preemption of conflicting 
rules, regulations, and policies·of the employer. See MD. ANN. CODE art .. 28, § 5-114.l(f)(4) 
(1986): No decisional law addressing any effect on civil service rules and regulations has been 
found. In addition, the Baltimore City Code has established provisions governing city em· 
ployees. Baltimore City Code, A:rt. I,§ 110-I26(a) (1974). 4 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 745, 
at 30:2I5-224 (Oi::t. 23, I989). Section 114 of the Code reserves to the employer the right 
to tali.e disciplinary action against its employees in accordance with the civil service provisions 
of the charter and other applicable laws. Id. at 30:2I8. The statutory provisions of this section 
are deemed to be a part of every collective bargaining agreement, but the employee's right 
to file a grievance over the interpretation and application of the contract or the agency's 
rules and regulations is preseI'Ved. Section I 22 of the Code states that arbitration of grievances 
is permitted unless binding arbitration is contrary to the City Charter, in which case arbitra· 
tion is advisory only. Id. at 30:223'. The City Charter allows binding arbitration of contract 
disputes. jd, at 30:215. Negotiated grievance procedures are in addition to those established 
by the board. of estimates, and the employee must elect which procedure to pursue. Id. at 
30:223. The' employee's election is binding. 
221 See TEX. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 5I54c-I, § 20(b) (Vernon 1987). 
222 See City of San Antonio Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Villanueva, 
630 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. Ct. App. I981); City of San Antonio Firemen's and Policemen's 
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Lott, 630 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981). 
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preempted by federal or state law, home rule ordinances, or the 
authority of any civil service commission to conduct and grade 
exams and rate candidates.223 Similarly, in the Meyers-Milias-Brown 
Act, 224 California gives priority to laws and rules regarding merit 
and civil service systems. 225 The California courts have construed 
civil service laws to be compatible with the bargaining law in most 
cases, however, and have required negotiations over topics covered 
by civil service, including discharge.225 
The law governing state employees in California (hereinafter 
"SEERA") also preserves the merit principle and prohibits any lim-
itation on entitlements of civil service employees.227 This law then 
lists those statutory provisions that may be preempted by a collective 
bargaining agreement, those that may be preempted unless the 
223 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4330(a) (1989). See generally Goetz, The Kansas Public 
EmplO)·er Employee Relations Law, 28 KAN. L. REv. 243 (1980) for a thorough discussion of the 
Kansas statute. Goetz cites Local 1357, AFSCME v. Emporia State University, P.E.R.B. Case 
No. CAE6-1979 (Feb. 18, 1980), in which the Public Employee Relations Board ("PERB") 
adopted a hearing officer's decision holding that employers are required to negotiate about 
subjects that are covered by existing administrative rules and regulations. See 28 KAN. L. REv. 
at 284-87. Any agreement on such issues must be approved by the relevant governing body. 
A grievance procedure providing for arbitration of dismissals is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining, and any agreement to such a procedure "could be approved by the appointing 
authority and the Director of Personnel Services as a supplement to the civil service proce-
dures established in Section 75-2949." Id. at 286. In Kansas Board of Regents v. Pittsburgh State 
University Chapter, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld PERB's conclusion that the statute 
required bargaining about both the period of time a university faculty member must serve 
before consideration for tenure and the procedures for retrenchment or reductions in staff. 
233 Kan. 801, 824-25, 667 P.2d 306, 322-23, 116 L.R.R.M. 2696, 2709-10 (1983). 
22~ CAL. Gov'T. CODE§§ 3500-10 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990). The Meyers-Milias-Brown 
Act covers public employees other than state and school employees. Id. § 3501. 
• 22s See id. § 3500 (West 1980). 
226 See, e.g., Taylor v. Crane, 24 Cal. 3d 442, 450-53, 595 P.2d 129, 134-36, 155 Cal. 
Rptr. 695, 700-02, 101 L.R.R.M. 3060, 3063-65 (1979) (where city charter does not expressly 
ban arbitration of discharge, arbitrator's decision is binding on the city); Los Angeles County 
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 55, 65-66, 588 P.2d 249, 254-55, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 547, 552-53, 100 L.R.R.M. 2854, 2859 (1978) (civil service commission of county must 
meet and confer with union prior to changing layoff rules); Cerini v. City of Cloverdale, 191 
Cal. App. 3d 1471, 1480-81, 237 Cal. Rptr. 116, 122 (1987) (city council must negotiate 
before changing procedure for appeal of discharge); Los Angeles Police Protective League 
v. City of Los Angeles, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1146, 209 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (1985) 
(agreement that purports to exclude discharge grievances from grievance procedure because 
they are appealable using the procedure created by city ordinance is of no effect because it 
is against public policy favoring arbitration and employee can file grievance after exhausting 
procedure created by ordinance). 
227 See CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 3512 (West 1980). See generally Comment, California's SEERA 
v. The Civil Service System: Making State Employee Collective Bargaining Work, IS U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 829 (1985), for a thorough discussion of the relationship between the State Employer-
Employee Relations Act and civil service. 
134 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:95 
State Personnel Board finds the collective bargaining agreement to 
be inconsistent with the merit principle, and those that cannot be 
preempted absent approval of the collective bargaining agreement 
by the legislature.228 The Supreme Court of California rejected a 
challenge to SEERA based on the state constitutional provisions that 
created a merit-based civil service system and a State Personnel 
Board for enforcement of the system.229 The court found no facial 
conflict between collective bargaining and the merit principle, but 
recognized that the product of bargaining, in theory, could interfere 
with the merit principle. 230 The court stated, however, that the 
legislature effectively minimized the possibility of conflict.231 In har-
monizing the constitutional provision giving the State Personnel 
Board jurisdiction to review disciplinary actions with the provisions 
of SEERA, the court stated that the constitution does not preclude 
creation of another agency to consider the legality of employee 
discipline. 232 
Florida provides the final example of a state that addresses the 
issue through priority of law provisions. The Florida law does not 
address negotiability expressly but, by implication, permits the par-
ties to negotiate provisions in conflict with other laws. If the contract 
as negotiated conflicts with a law, ordinance, rule, or regulation 
over which the negotiating employer has no amendatory authority, 
the employer must propose an amendment to the appropriate body, 
and the conflicting provision will have no effect until the amend-
ment occurs.233 The act also specifies that where civil service conflicts 
with the bargaining statute, the bargaining statute governs, but if 
there is no conflict, the bargaining law does not affect the civil 
service system.234 Finally, an employee can choose between the civil 
service appeal procedure and the contract's binding arbitration pro-
228 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3517 .6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990). The latter provision, which 
permits legislative amendment to render an othenvise unlawful contract enfqrceable, effec-
tuates the legislature's intent to eliminate conflicts over whether subjects are negotiable and 
requires bargaining subject to the decision of the legislature. See Comment, supra note 227, 
at 844-48. 
229 See Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 174, 624 P.2d 1215, 1217, 172 
Cal. Rptr. 487, 489-90, 109 L.R.R.M. 2674, 2675 (1981). 
230 See id. at 185, 624 P.2d at 1224, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 496, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2681. 
231 See id. at 185-86, 624 P.2d at 1224-25, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 496-97, 109 L.R.R.M. at 
268. 
232 See id. at 196-200, 624 P.2d at 1231-34, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 503-06, 109 L.R.R.M. at 
2687-89. 
233 See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 447.309(3) (West 1981). 
234 See id. § 447.601. 
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cedure for grievances, but the employee cannot pursue the same 
grievance under both procedures. 235 
The Florida Supreme Court construed these· sections regarding 
conflicts of law in Hillsborough County Governmental Employees Associ-
ation v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority.236 The court held that 
a public employer must implement a ·negotiated agreement even 
though it conflicts with civil service rules and regulations that the 
civil service commission refuses to amend to conform to the con-
tract. 237 Any other decision would interfere excessively with the 
employees' state constitutional right to bargain.238 In addition, the 
Florida Supreme Court has held that a city is required to bargain 
on demotion and discharge standards and appeals despite civil ser-
vice provisions.on the subject because the bargaining statute prevails 
over a conflicting ordinance, even where the ordinance creating the 
civil service commission is authorized by the state constitution. 239 
2. Strengths and Weaknesses of State Law Approaches Regulating 
the Relationship of Collective Bargaining to Other Laws 
a. Statutory Provisions Regarding Enforceability and Negotiability 
The various state approaches discussed above each have 
strengths and weaknesses. A statute that addresses negotiability or 
enforceability alone, like the Nebraska and Vermont state employee 
statutes, leaves open the possibility of great confusion about civil 
service and bargaining.240 Where a subject is negotiable, a negoti-
ated contract provision should be enforceable. Any other condusion 
requires the parties to engage in useless negotiations. In addition, 
as noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: 
To permit [a party] to enter into agreements and include 
terms such as grievance arbitration which raise the expec-
235 See id. § 447.401 (1990 Supp.). The statute requires that each negotiated contract 
contain a procedure for binding arbitration of grievances. 
236 522 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1988). 
237 Id. at 363. For further discussion of the Hillsborough County case, see infra notes 249-
50 and accompanying text. 
238 Id. at 362. The court relied on the state constitutional right of employees to bargain 
collectively and held that the civil service goals of uniform personnel administration and 
equal pay for equal work were not sufficiently compelling to warrant the significant inter-
ference with this fundamental constitutional right. Id. 
239 See City of Casselberry v. Orange County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 482 So. 2d 336, 
337-39 (Fla. 1986). 
240 See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text. 
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tations of those concerned, and then to subsequently re-
fuse to abide by those provisions on the basis of its lack 
of capacity would invite discord and distrust and create 
an atmosphere wherein a harmonious relationship would 
be virtually impossible to maintain.241 
In order to achieve the statutory purpose of encouraging harmo-
nious collective bargaining relationships, the legislature should in-
clude language in the statute that clearly defines the relationship of 
civil service and collective bargaining in both the scope of negotiable 
subjects and the enforcement of contractual provisions. In the ab-
sence of such language, a court or administrative agency may con-
clude that the scope of the bargaining obligation differs from the 
scope of enforceable contract language. 
The alternative to this approach is that used by SEERA.242 
SEERA requires negotiation on all subjects encompassed by the 
statutory definition, but disallows enforcement of contract provi-
sions contrary to certain laws unless the legislature approves the 
contract and amends the contrary code provisions. 243 Thus, the 
scope of negotiability is potentially much broader than the scope of 
enforceability. This approach has the apparent advantage of re-
moving conflicts over subjects of negotiation from the bargaining 
table and requiring negotiations regardless of alleged conflicts with 
other laws.244 In theory, delays in bargaining will be avoided and 
the salutary effects of negotiations will be achieved. The parties can 
negotiate about matters of importance to them and attempt to 
persuade the legislature to approve the agreement and amend the 
conflicting laws. 
Advantages of this approach are outweighed by its disadvan-
tages, however. The parties may expend much time and energy 
negotiating provisions that will never be implemented. Expectations 
may be raised and dashed. Rather than routine approval of collec-
tive bargaining agreements, if required, the legislature will be be-
sieged with petitions to amend existing laws. Although there may 
be fewer delays in negotiations, 245 there may be substantial delays 
241 Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66, 72, 
391 A.2d 1318, 1322, 99 L.R.R.M. 3278, 3281 (1978). 
242 See CAL. Gov'T. CooE § 3517.6 (West Supp. 1990). The State Employer-Employee 
Relations Act is now known as the Ralph C. Dills Act. Id. § 3524. 
243 See id.§§ 3516, 3517.6; Comment, supra note 227, at 844-46. 
244 Comment, supra note 227, at 844-45 n.65. 
245 The California experience has demonstrated that laws of this type do not necessarily 
discourage refusals to bargain on the basis of conflict with other laws, at least in the years 
immediately after enactment of the statute. See id. at 846-47. 
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in approval of the contract where it requires amendment of existing 
statutes. This procedure may also foster charges of bad faith where 
one party believes that the other party is not effectively lobbying 
for the amendment. Contrary to the purpose of the collective bar-
gaining law, the procedure may damage, rather than improve, the 
relationship of the parties. Furthermore, the parties are free to seek 
amendment of existing statutes that potentially conflict with collec-
tive bargaining agreements without the necessity of first expending 
resources negotiating an unenforceable agreement. 246 
In addition, although this structure may work reasonably well 
for state employees negotiating with state employers in the context 
of state statutes, its use in laws covering employees of political 
subdivisions becomes much more complex. Negotiations between 
local government employers and employees take place in the con-
text of not only state statutes, but also municipal charters, local 
ordinances, and home rule provisions, not to mention rules and 
regulations promulgated pursuant to all of the above. 
Different legislative or administrative bodies control amend-
ment of the various laws and regulations governing local employees. 
To require an employe:r and a union to negotiate about all subjects 
and seek approval from all bodies with conflicting laws and regu-
lations imposes a herculean task, the effect of which is likely to be 
the same as prohibiting negotiations on the subjects altogether. Not 
only is the task enormous, but the likelihood of success on all fronts 
is minimal, thus discouraging the parties from undertaking nego-
tiations. This outcome is particularly likely where subjects conflict 
with state statutes. Because most statutes apply to many, if not all, 
government bodies, the legislature is unlikely to amend a statute at 
the request, however urgently pressed, of one local government 
unit and one union. If achieved, success will likely result from a 
lengthy lobbying process by a number of groups. If that is the case, 
the amendment is equally effective when ·it comes before, rather 
than after, the negotiations. Moreover, it is more efficient for the 
legislature to address the issue as a part of its determination of 
negotiability under the bargaining statute than as a response to 
petitions to amend other statutes to conform to negotiated agree-
ments. 
246 Arguably, the parties will be more motivated to press for statutory amendments with 
a collective bargaining agreement at stake. If this is so, however, it suggests that the issue is 
not sufficiently important to the parties to require a change in the law. 
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The Florida experience highlights. the difficulties of such laws. 
Its bargaining law states that if a collective bargaining agreement 
conflicts with existing laws, ordinances, rules, or regulations over 
which the negotiating employer247 has no amendatory power, the 
employer shall propose an amendment, and the contract will not 
be effective until the conflicting law is amended. 248 Hillsborough 
County negotiated an agreement containing provisions regarding 
various terms and conditions of employment that conflicted with 
terms set by the civil service commission.249 The civil service com-
mission refused to amend its rules, and the employer refused to 
implement the agreement. The Florida Supreme Court ultimately 
resolved the issue, concluding that allowing the civil service com-
mission to veto the agreement was too great an interference with 
the right to bargain collectively. 250 Accordingly, the court required 
the employer to implement the agreement without civil service ap-
proval. For all of these reasons, contract clauses on subjects that are 
negotiable under the statute should be enforceable without the 
necessity of amending existing laws or regulations. 
Similarly, where the contract clauses on civil service subjects are 
enforceable under the statute, negotiation about sw:h subjects 
should be required.251 By providing for the enforceability of such 
247 The statute requires the chief executive officer of the public employer to negotiate 
with the union. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.309(1) (West 1981). The chief executive officer 
for the state is the governor, and for other public employers, it is the person responsible to 
the legislative body for the administration of the employer. See id.§ 447.203(9). 
248 See id. § 447.309(3). 
249 Hillsborough County Govtl. Employees Ass'n v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 
522 So. 2d 358, 359 (Fla. 1988). 
250 Id. at 363. 
251 The one exception to the rule that enforceability should be coextensive with the 
scope of mandatory negotiations is the creation of a category of permissive bargaining 
subjects. Under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which covers private sector 
employees, bargaining subjects have been divided into three categories-mandatory, permis-
sive, and illegal. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). 
Parties are allowed, but not required, to negotiate about permissive subjects. Once a contract 
clause on a permissive subject is included in the agreement, however, it is enforceable in a 
breach of contract action under § 301 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988). See C. MORRIS, 
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 848 (2d ed. 1983). As virtually all matters covered by civil 
service law involve terms and conditions of employment, they will be encompassed in any 
definition of bargaining subjects that is not unduly restrictive. See Edwards, supra note 1 at 
910-11. A subject that falls within the definition is a mandatory bargaining subject unless 
civil service law removes it from the area of required negotiation. If the legislature determines 
that bargaining is a threat to civil service principles with respect to any employment condition 
covered by the relevant definition of bargaining, negotiation should be prohibited. If not, 
bargaining should be required. See C. MORRIS, supra, at 848-63 for examples of permissive 
subjects of bargaining. The civil service/collective bargaining conflict should not implicate 
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contract provisions, the legislature, like the employer that negotiates 
such provisions, creates expectations on the part of the employees 
that the union will be able to negotiate a contract covering the 
matter.252 If the issue is significant to the employees, and the union 
is unable to satisfy those expectations because the employer lawfully 
refuses to negotiate, the result will be a group of dissatisfied em-
ployees. 253 This dissatisfaction may manifest itself in lack of pro-
ductivity and/or disruption of work, again defeating the purposes 
of the collective bargaining statute. Accordingly, uniformity of ne-
gotiable and enforceable contract provisions should be a legislative 
goal in enactment of the bargaining statute, and both should be 
expressly delineated in the law to avoid disputes and contrary court 
decisions. 
b. The Use of General Language Regarding Conflicts with Other Laws 
The use of general, rather than specific, language regarding 
both subjects of bargaining and enforceability of contracts as they 
relate to other laws has certain advantages. With respect to the 
scope of required negotiations, the statutes with general provisions 
take two basic forms. One group requires bargaining over terms 
and conditions of employment, except where the conditions are 
mandated by other laws. 254 The second group mandates bargaining 
over terms and conditions of employment, except where certain 
matters are reserved to the civil service commission. 255 
permissive subjects of bargaining even in those states where such a category exists. ·compare 
City of Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 50-51, 242 N.W.2d 
231, 234, 92 L.R.R.M. 3318, 3320 (1976) (a category of permissive bargaining subjects exists) 
with Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 166, 393 A.2d 
278, 279, 98 L.R.R.M. 3285, 3292 (1978) (no category of permissive bargaining subjects 
exists). 
252 See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
255 The employees also may experience dissatisfaction if they are unable to achieve their 
desired changes because of lack of power in the negotiating process. Lack of power, however, 
is at least potentially remediable whereas a legal bar to negotiation removes any possibility 
of accomplishing the desired change. 
2M This group includes those statutes that ban negotiations over conditions that would 
violate other laws. The states in this category are Vermont (state employees), Nebraska (state 
employees), Illinois (public employees and education employees), Kansas, Maine (state em-
ployees), and Pennsylvania. The Maine and Vermont statutes also contain language providing 
that the statute shall not be construed to contravene the spirit of the merit system. See supra 
notes 178-82 and accompanying text. The Alaska statute contains similar language with no 
other reference to conflicts with other laws. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
255 States in this group include Connecticut (state and municipal employees), Ohio, Iowa, 
Washington, Maine (public employees), and New Hampshire. Typically, the matters reserved 
to the civil service commission are those deemed essential to the merit principle, such as 
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The first approach ensures that all other conflicting statutes 
have the effect desired by the legislature, thus relieving the legis-
lature of the problem of investigating and analyzing possible con-
flicts. The legislature can eliminate later-discovered, unintended 
conflicts by amending the conflicting statute. Although it diminishes 
the workload of the legislature, this method creates problems of 
interpretation for the courts and administrative agency. The inter-
pretation problem is particularly acute when negotiations about 
provisions that supplement, implement, or relate to a subject cov-
ered by another statute are permitted, whereas negotiations over 
matters specifically provided for in other laws are prohibited.256 
The decisional body must determine whether the disputed pro-
posal, in fact, conflicts with existing law, or whether it simply relates 
without conflict. 257 
An example in the disciplinary area illustrates the problem. If 
a union seeks to negotiate a grievance and arbitration procedure 
for disciplinary actions, the employer may refuse on the ground 
that the civil service law provides an appeal procedure. A challenge 
to the refusal to negotiate must be resolved by deciding whether 
the civil service law prohibits negotiation. Does the grievance and 
arbitration procedure conflict with the civil service law, or does it 
merely supplement the civil service law by providing an additional 
procedure? If the state intended the civil service procedure to be 
exclusive, there is a conflict. If not, the grievance procedure is 
supplementary. The language of the civil service statute may not be 
clear on the issue of exclusivity because, with few exceptions, states 
designed civil service procedures at a time when no potentially 
conflicting procedures existed. If the language is unclear, the de-
ciding body must look to legislative intent and the policies under-
lying the statutes. 
If the union seeks to replace the civil service procedure with 
the grievance procedure, it raises an additional set of issues regard-
ing negotiability. Even if the legislature did not intend the proce-
conducting and grading exams, rating candidates, and making initial appointments from lists 
of eligibles. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-272(d) (West 1988); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 26, § 969 (1988). The Maine statute for public employees also contains specific provisions 
regarding discipline. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 969. Cf IowA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West 1989), 
which declares that the bargaining act does not diminish the authority and power of the civil 
service commission not only with respect to the above-mentioned subjects, but also with 
respect to classification, reclassification, and appeal rights. 
256 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1607, 1710(b) (Smith-Hurd 1986). 
257 See, e.g., Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univs. v. Illinois Educ. Labor 
Relations Bd., 170 Ill. App. 3d 463, 469'-72, 524 N.E.2d 758, 761-62 (1988). 
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<lure to be exclusive, replacement of the procedure may pose a 
conflict by depriving employees of a procedure made available to 
them by statute. The legislature must determine whether the exclu-
sive bargaining representative selected pursuant to the labor rela-
tions law can waive statutory rights of employees, and, if so, whether 
such a waiver is consistent with the employees' constitutional due 
process rights. 258 As is evident, a statutory provision that prohibits 
negotiations about matters in conflict with other laws creates signif-
icant and often difficult issues of statutory interpretation. 
Although this approach lacks legislative clarity, it is arguably 
preferable to describe the mandatory and prohibited subjects of 
bargaining as generally as possible, avoiding a "rigid legislative lim-
itation on the scope of bargaining."259 Delegating difficult decisions 
about the scope of bargaining to an administrative agency with labor 
relations expertise permits changes in judgments about appropriate 
subjects for bargaining without the necessity of statutory amend-
ment. 260 Notions about appropriate subjects for bargaining have 
evolved in both the private and public sectors as society and labor 
relations have changed. 261 Where possible, the statute should be 
written to permit such evolution. Because the potential conflict with 
civil service law is so pervasive and easily anticipated, 262 however, 
and because resolution of the conflict necessitates decisions about 
the priority of legislative enactments based on the importance of 
public policy, it is a matter that can and should be addressed by the 
legislature. 
258 See infra notes 358-71 and accompanying text. 
259 Edwards, supra note 1, at 916. See Schmedemann, The Scope of Bargaining in Minne-
sota's Public Sector Labor Relations: A Proposal for Change, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 213, 232 
(1984), for a discussion of the difficulties in interpreting a general provision regarding 
conflicts with other laws. As noted by the author, while a contract provision calling for a 
school year of 175 days would clearly conflict with a statute requiring a 180-day school year, 
it is unclear whether the same provision W!>uld conflict with a statute giving school boards 
the responsibility of setting school calendars. 
260 Edwards, supra note 1, at 916. Judge Edwards suggests, however, that statutory 
limitations on subjects of negotiation are counterproductive because they limit the therapeutic 
benefits of bargaining and interfere with harmonious labor relations. 
261 See Edwards, supra note l, at 916-19; B. MELTZER & S. HENDERSON, LABOR LAw 851 
(3d ed. 1985). 
262 See Edwards, supra note l, at 910. Other statutes that pose potential conflict with 
bargaining obligations include statutes setting terms and conditions of employment, such as 
Jaws that establish retirement plans for large categories of government employees. See, e.g., 
Fair Lawn Educ. Ass'n v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Educ., 79 NJ. 574, 576-78, 401A.2d681, 682-
83, 102 L.R.R.M. 2205, 2206-07 (1979). Other such statutes include those giving public 
officials, such as sheriffs or police chiefs, discretion to hire and fire employees. See, e.g., 
Fraternal Order of Police Ionia County Lodge No. 157 v. Bensinger, 122 Mich. App. 437, 
442, 333 N.W.2d 73, 75 (1983). 
142 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:95 
The Connecticut statute, which contains a broad description of 
the scope of bargaining with specific reservation of certain functions 
for the civil service commission, 263 achieves the goal of a flexible 
definition of the scope of bargaining. At the same time, it expresses 
the legislative judgment that certain functions of the civil service 
commission are too important for the merit principle to be modified 
by negotiation. Although there may be some dispute as to which 
civil service commission functions, if any, 264 should be preserved, 
the statutory language provides the most specific direction of leg-
islative intent without unreasonably restricting the flexibility of ne-
gotiations. 265 Because the act reserves for the civil service commis-
sion the authority to perform certain acts and precludes 
negotiations on those subjects,266 it conveys clearly the intent of the 
legislature to preclude bargaining on certain matters covered by 
civil service law but to permit bargaining on all aspects of civil service 
law not expressly excluded. 267 This formulation provides certainty 
and predictability for the parties to negotiations and for the agency 
and courts interpreting the law, avoiding the problem of creating 
263 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-272(c), (d) (West 1988). The statutes of Maine (public 
employees) and Ohio also use this approach. See supra notes 147, 194-97 and accompanying 
text. 
264 See infra notes 274-350 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether discipli· 
nary issues should be negotiable. 
265 But see State Emplo)'ees Association v. New Hampshire Public EmplO)'ee Labor Relations 
Board, in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted similar statutory language 
to preclude negotiations about discipline and discharge. 118 N.H. 885, 887, 890, 397 A.2d 
1035, 1036-37, 100 L.R.R.M. 2484, 2486 (1978). In State Employees Association, the court 
relied, in part, on a statutory bargaining exclusion for matters of managerial policy within 
the exclusive prerogative of the public employer. Id. at 890, 397 A.2d at 1038, 100 L.R.R.M. 
at 2486. To avoid this problem, the legislative intent to permit bargaining on other issues 
relating to civil service should be very clear in the legislative history or in the statute itself. 
The Maine public employees statute reserves certain functions to the civil service commission, 
and explicitly states that if the contract contains arbitration provisions regarding demotion, 
layoff, reinstatement, suspension, removal, discharge, or discipline, such provisions are con· 
trolling in the event of a conflict with civil service. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (1988). 
This provision does not expressly authorize bargaining over standards, procedures, and 
appeals of such actions, however, and therefore, may give rise to dispute over whether such 
matters are negotiable. Better language would directly address that issue, stating that all 
other matters covered by civil service law (excepting those expressly reserved to the com· 
mission) are negotiable, and any contract provision with respect to such matters is enforceable, 
notwithstanding any conflicting statutory provisions or civil service rules. 
266 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.'§ 5-272(d) (West 1986). 
267 The statute only precludes negotiation on the hiring and promotion functions of 
civil service. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 1, at 145. Wellington and Winter 
recommend that only the employment of new applicants should be excluded from collective 
bargaining and reserved to the civil service system. Id. 
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uncertainty about the negotiability of other subjects. 268 In addition, 
it allows for flexibility in determining requisite bargaining subjects 
where no potential conflict with civil service is involved. 
If the legislature has defined the scope of bargaining with 
relationship to civil service as discussed above, the law can provide 
for enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement despite con-
flicting civil service provisions, except where negotiations are pro-
hibited. This method of addressing enforceability269 clearly delin-
eates the interrelationship between the scope of bargaining and the 
enforcement of the agreement, providing the necessary uniform-
ity. 270 In addition, it offers specific language on enforcement to 
minimize disruptive disputes over compliance with a negotiated 
contract. 271 Predictability in contract administration is particularly 
important in encouraging a harmonious relationship between the 
employer and its employees. 272 The ability to enforce the contract 
is essential to meaningful collective bargaining.273 An agreement 
that is easily and peacefully negotiated, but not followed, is not only 
useless; it is destructive to working relationships and labor peace. 
If expectations about rights and duties created by a contract are 
continually frustrated by lack of enforceability of the agreement, 
problems and tensions in the work place that collective bargaining 
was designed to resolve will be exacerbated. Accordingly, statutory 
language that minimizes disputes about contract enforcement is 
essential to accomplish the central purposes o~ collective bargaining 
legislation. 
V. RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT 
As is evident from the review of state laws, some states require 
negotiation about disciplinary standards and procedures; others 
268 Of course, the legislature can only minimize the uncertainty. It cannot prevent 
litigation by recalcitrant parties based on strained or insupportable interpretations of the law. 
269 The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act ("IPLRA") offers an example of this type of 
priority provision. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1615 (Smith-Hurd 1986). The IPLRA 
contains language regarding the obligation to bargain that has the potential to create con-
fusion, however. See id. para. 1607 and supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text. 
210 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. 
271 See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. 
272 See T. KOCHAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 385-86 (1980). 
273 "[A] statute which encouraged the negotiation of agreements, yet permitted the 
parties to retract their concessions and repudiate their promises whenever they choose, would 
impede effective bargaining .... Successful bargaining rests upon the sanctity and legal 
viability of the given word." Glendale City Employees Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 15 Cal. 3d 
328, 336, 540 P.2d 609, 614-15, 124 Cal. Rptr. 513, 518-19, 90 L.R.R.M. 2603, 2607 (1975). 
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have determined that the civil service law preempts such negotia-
tion. In other states, the issue is present but unresolved. The re-
maining question is which resolution of the conflict best preserves 
the important goals of civil service and collective bargaining. 
As previously noted, the essential principle of the civil service 
system is employment on the basis of merit rather than political 
patronage. Although political patronage remains a fact of life in 
some jurisdictions, 274 the focus of public employees has shifted from 
protection from political pressures to obtaining a role in determin-
ing their terms and conditions of employment through collective 
bargaining.275 There is little dispute about the value of the merit 
principle in theory,276 but there is substantial question about 
whether the civil service system, as it has evolved, is essential to 
preservation of the merit principle. 277 In most states, the civil service 
system is no longer limited to its initial purpose of employment on 
the basis of merit,278 but instead has become a personnel system.279 
Noted commentators have suggested that the comprehensive civil 
service system "complicates the achievement of a rational regime of 
collective bargaining."28o 
To insure preservation of the merit principle, one must deter-
mine which functions of the civil service system are essential to that 
principle. 281 The hiring function of civil service is most essential to 
the merit principle because it ensures that new employees are hired 
on the basis of merit.282 Most civil service systems use an examina-
tion process to rate candidates for appointment to classified posi-
274 See Comment, First Amendment Limitations on Patronage Employment Practices, 49 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 181, 201 & n.130 and works cited therein (1982); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 
507, 508 (1980); Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 (1990). 
21s See LMSA, supra note 7, at 19-27. 
21s R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 167. 
211 Id. at 167-70; see LMSA, supra note 7, at 15. 
278 R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 9-27, 9-30; Aaron, supra note 9, at 162; Comment, 
supra note 38, at 828. 
219 Id.; Stanley, supra note 48, at 109. 
280 H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note l, at 143; see Edwards, supra note l, at 91 I. 
281 Some years ago, Helburn and Bennett suggested this as the way to preserve both 
the merit system and collective bargaining. Helburn & Bennett, supra note 37, at 626-27; see 
also R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 9-29. 
282 But see Savas & Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 70-71; R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 169-
70. Notably, early civil service laws regulated only hiring, not discharge. The discipline 
provisions evolved to protect the employee from discipline on the basis of political patronage, 
but were not initially viewed as necessary for civil service reform. R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, 
at 5-36 to 5-38. By depriving officials of the ability to appoint on the basis of politics, 
reformers believed that any incentive to discharge for political reasons would be removed. 
Id. at 5-36. 
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tions. 283 The civil service or merit commission designs and conducts 
the examination, often in consultation with the officials of the de-
partment for which employees are to be hired.284 The commission 
then grades the exams and rates candidates on the basis of scores, 
placing the candidates on an eligibility list. 285 The commission, or 
the supervising government officials in the department for which 
the hiring is made, then appoints candidates from the list.286 The 
commission may use the rule of one, under which the highest 
scoring candidate is selected, or the rule of three, which allows the 
appointing official to choose any of the top three candidates. 287 
Unless one subscribes to the view that the merit system should be 
abolished or changed significantly,288 the initial appointment pro-
cess, including the conduct and grading of exams and the rating of 
candidates on the basis of test scores, should be excluded from 
bargaining.289 The Connecticut and Ohio legislatures have taken 
this approach.290 
Commentators also have argued that retention of employees 
on the basis of merit is essential to the system. 291 This might suggest 
that unions should be precluded from negotiating about disciplinary 
standards, procedures for discipline, and procedures to challenge 
discipline, for fear that unions would negotiate limitations on man-
agement's right to discipline or terminate unsatisfactory employees. 
To the extent that the merit system is concerned with elimination 
of politics as a criterion for employment, there is little danger that 
allowing unions to negotiate about disciplinary matters will lead to 
a return to patronage.292 Unions representing public employees 
2ss Lewin, supra note 16, at 429. 
28• See Savas & Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 74. 
285 See Lewin, supra note 16, at 429; Savas & Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 74. 
286 See id. 
281 Lewin, supra note 16, at 429; R. KEARNEY, supra note 7, at 185; R. VAUGHN, supra 
note 7, at 3-11. 
288 See Savas & Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 83-85 for a discussion of the need for civil 
service reform. 
289 See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note l, at 145. It is not uncommon for 
collective bargaining statutes to reserve to management the exclusive authority to select 
personnel, removing hiring from the scope of collective bargaining. See e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 273-A:l XI (1987). 
290 See supra notes 185-86, 190-97 and accompanying text. The Connecticut statute 
exempts the establishment of exams from bargaining; the Ohio statute does not. Compare 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-272(d) (West 1988) with OHIO REv. ConE ANN. § 4ll7.08(B) 
(Baldwin 1983). 
291 See R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, ~t 9-29 to 9-30. 
292 See id. at 9-28; Comment, supra note 38, at 838-39. 
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have supported merit systems for years.293 Furthermore, although 
unions in the public sector are involved in political lobbying for 
union and employee interests, acceding to a patronage system of 
employment ultimately would be contrary to the interests of the 
union.294 The loyalty of the employees to the union in a political 
patronage ·system eventually would be replaced by loyalty to politi-
cians, once the employees recognized where the real power lay. 
When this shift of loyalty occurred, the union would no longer be 
a necessary middle person for the employees, and decertification 
would be likely.295 Because it is unlikely that unions will seek a return 
to the patronage system, allowing unions to negotiate regarding 
discipline poses little or no threat to the merit system goal of elim-
inating political considerations from employment. 
As political patronage has become less significant, however, the 
merit system has come to be viewed as a means not only of elimi-
nating patronage employment, but also of promoting economy and 
efficiency in government by ensuring employment based on 
merit.296 To achieve this objective, disciplinary standards and pro-
cedures, and appeals procedures must allow discipline and termi-
nation of incompetent employees while ensuring that competent 
employees cannot be disciplined or terminated arbitrarily by man-
agers motivated by considerations other than merit. Furthermore, 
employees must believe that disciplinary decisions are fairly made, 
based on uniform standards, and that a fair procedure exists for 
challenging decisions perceived to be based on considerations other 
than merit. To the extent that employees believe otherwise, achieve-
ment of effective and efficient government will be hampered by 
employee morale problems. 297 
The question that must be considered in deciding whether 
collective bargaining impinges upon the merit principle is whether 
permitting negotiations over disciplinary issues will result in reten-
tion_ of poor employees or allow termination of competent employ-
ees. Although predicting what unions will seek to negotiate is always 
hazardous, both experience and consideration of union and em-
ployee interests suggest that union proposals for disciplinary stan-
dards and procedures will i:iot be inimical to the merit principle. 
293 R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 9-28; Wurf, supra note 18, at 432. 
294 R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 9-28 to 9-29. 
295 Id. at 9-28. 
296 AARON, supra note 9, at 162. 
297 See Killingsworth, Grievance Adjudication in Public Employment, 13 ARB. J. 3, 15 ( 1958). 
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First, unions have not opposed the merit principle in the past.298 
On the contrary, they have supported it.299 Union opposition to civil 
service commissions stems from a belief that these commissions are 
management functionaries, not impartial adjudicatory bodies.300 
Second, unions typically negotiate 'just cause" requirements 
for discipline.301 A just cause or cause requirement differs little, if 
at all, from the provisions contained in most civil service laws with 
respect to discipline. 302 Although unions can be expected to fight 
to prove that the employer did not have just cause for discharging 
an employee when the employee grieves a termination, unions will 
rarely, if at all, attempt to negotiate language that would prohibit 
discharge of incompetent employees or employees who engage in 
serious misconduct. It might be argued, however, that private sector 
employers have more incentive to resist limitations on the right to 
discharge employees because of the profit motive.303 If this is so, 
then the statistical data regarding the frequency with which unions 
negotiate just cause provisions might not hold true for the public 
sector. 
It will rarely be in the union's interest, however, even where 
feasible, to negotiate provisions that protect incompetent or abusive 
employees.304 Employees whom the union represents, and must 
298 See Stanley, supra note 48, at 113; R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 9-28. 
299 Id. 
soo R. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 9-28 to 9-29; Wurf, supra note 18, at 432; Lewin, supra 
note 16, at 432. 
soi In a survey of patterns in collective bargaining agreements conducted by the Bureau 
of National Affairs and based on 400 contracts, 86% of the contracts required that discharge 
be for "cause" or '~ust cause." 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) § 40.1 (Basic 
Patterns: Discharge, Discipline and Resignation) (Mar. 9, 1989). Ninety-four percent of the 
contracts surveyed contained grounds for discharge. The grounds were of two types-
discharge for cause or just cause and discharge for specific offenses. Id. Based on this 
information, it is unlikely that unions will seek or be able to obtain limitations on discharge 
that are inconsistent with termination or retention based on merit or cause. 
3o2 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-1833 (1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 241.430 (1987). 
sos See Comment, supra note 38, at 838-39, where this argument is suggested. When 
management attorneys, Lee Shaw and R. Theodore Clark, discuss the problems resulting 
from collective bargaining by unmotivated and inexperienced public management, they do 
not mention the issue of unwillingness or inability to resist limitations on the right to discipline 
for cause. See Shaw & Clark, supra note 60, at 875-76. 
SDi As persuasively pointed out by Lewin and Horton, "self-interest or perceptions of 
self-interest dictate the policies of interest groups in collective bargaining." Supra note 11, at 
205. Thus, in some circumstances, management may take positions in bargaining that support 
merit principles. In other situations, the same management officials may take positions 
inconsistent with merit principles. The same is true of unions. Notably, in a study of public 
sector labor relations, the authors found that "unions have not negotiated rules or practices 
that, on average, adversely affect productivity." D. LEWIN, P. FEUILLE, T. KOCHAN,]. DELANEY, 
PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS 517 (1988). 
148 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:95 
satisfy in order to retain its position as a collective bargaining rep-
resentative, 305 seek fair treatment, but have little or no interest in 
protecting incompetent employees. On the contrary, competent em-
ployees are likely to resent the union's efforts to protect employees 
who are perceived to be incompetent. This effect is inimical to the 
union's interest in satisfying its constituency. Further, incompetent 
employees are unlikely to recognize or admit their incompetence, 
which may be a necessary prerequisite to pressing the union to 
negotiate for protections. At a minimum, it is doubtful that restric-
tions on discipline beyond just cause limitations will be a high prior-
ity for the union in negotiations. It is even less likely that employees 
would be willing to strike, where lawful, for such provisions. Thus, 
strong management resistance is unnecessary to prevent inroads on 
the merit principle. 
Furthermore, many statutes contain management rights pro-
visions that expressly provide that management has the right to 
discipline employees for just cause.306 In such states, any contractual 
limitations on management's right to discipline for just cause would 
be unenforceable. Thus, there is little risk that allowing negotiation 
over disciplinary standards will impair the merit principle. 
Negotiation of procedural protections for employees in the 
event of discipline, such as notice and opportunity to be heard, 
arguably would place certain hurdles in the way of management 
seeking to discipline employees and might discourage discipline of 
culpable employees. Such argument, however, is unpersuasive in-
sofar as it suggests limiting negotiation. First, in the event of ter-
mination, the United States Constitution requires a pre-termination 
hearing for public employees with civil service status.307 Thus, cer-
tain protections are inherent regardless of any contractu~l require-
ments. Second, many civil service systems already contain proce-
dural safeguards such as notice, an opportunity to be heard, and 
the right to representation at any hearing.308 Third, just cause lim-
305 See D. BoK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 15, at 77. The authors note that union leaders 
are "under heavy constraint to pay close attention" to the desires of the members in contract 
negotiations. Id. 
S06 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 447.209 (West rn81); HAW. REv. STAT.§ 89-9(d) (1988); 
lowA CODE ANN.§ 20.7 (West 1989). 
307 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-42 (1985). In Loudennill, 
the civil service status of the employee provided a property interest in employment sufficient 
to trigger the protections of procedural due process. Id. at 538-41. 
sos See D. STANLEY, supra note 1, at 55-56; see, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 19574.5 (West 
1980 & Supp. 1990); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 31, § 41 (1989); N.Y. C1v. SERV. LAw § 75(2) 
(McKinney 1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§§ 41.06.170, 41.06.176 (Supp. 1990). 
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itations on discipline have been construed to require some proce-
dural protections even in the absence of explicit procedural require-
ments. 309 Given the current widespread requirements for pre-
termination procedures, it scarcely can be contended that such pro-
cedures are inconsistent with the merit principle. Furthermore, to 
suggest that unions should be prevented from negotiating due pro-
cess protections for employees because it will make it more difficult 
to terminate poor employees is inconsistent with American societal 
principles of justice. To the extent that such protections foster the 
view that it is difficult for government to discharge incompetents, 
the civil service and constitutional protections serve the same func-
tion yet they are an essential part of the merit system. Therefore, 
allowing unions to bargain about procedural requirements for dis-
cipline is not inconsistent with the merit principle of employment.310 
309 See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 67, at 673-74; see, e.g., Rodriguez v. Dept. 
of Sanitation, 437 So. 2d 378, 379 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Holden, Grievance Arbitration, in 
PORTRAIT OF A PROCESS-COLI.ECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 374, 382 (1979). 
310 Progressive discipline requirements or provisions that protect employees from dis-
cipline on the basis of stale misconduct are also negotiated and placed in collective bargaining 
agreements. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 67, at 671-73, 680. These provisions 
might be considered hybrids because they have both procedural and substantive elements. 
Neither, however, is inconsistent with employment based on merit. A progressive discipline 
system merely provides for a progressive system of warnings and more serious discipline for 
repeated violations of standards of conduct or rules. Id. at 671. Progressive discipline systems 
typically reserve to management the right to skip steps of the procedure for serious miscon-
duct. Id. Such systems are common in both public and private employment, including civil 
service. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 41.06.176 (Supp. 1990) (employee whose work is 
unsatisfactory is entitled to written notice of deficiency and opportunity to improve unless 
deficiency is extreme); Thompson v. American Motor Inns, 623 F. Supp. 409, 410-11, 418, 
121L.R.R.M.2066, 2067-68, 2073 (W.D. Va. 1985) (employer breached implied employment 
contract when it fired employee without following the warning procedure specified in em-
ployee handbook); Brigham v. Department of Health and Welfare, 106 Idaho 347, 350-51, 
679 P.2d 147, 150-51 (1984) (termination invalidated because of failure to evaluate based 
on express standards and to provide an opportunity to improve). Just cause requirements 
for discipline have been interpreted to require progressive discipline for lesser offenses, even 
where not expressly mandated. See, e.g., In re Kennedy, 442 So. 2d 566, 569 (La. Ct. App. 
1983) (no just cause for dismissal where no evidence of previous misconduct); Ryder v. 
Department of Health and Human Resources, 400 So. 2d 1123, 1126 (La. Ct. App. 1981) 
(cause for discharge under civil service Jaw may be a totality of lesser offenses, repeated 
improper conduct after lesser disciplinary action, or a single aggravated incident); Blake v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 310 S.E.2d 472, 473-74 (W. Va. 1983) (dismissal may be too severe a 
penalty for a civil service employee depending on the gravity of the offense and the prior 
employment record). Some civil service systems also limit the right to discipline employees 
based on prior incidents of misconduct. See, e.g., N.Y. C1v. SERV. LAw § 75(4) (McKinney 
Supp. 1990) (employer cannot impose discipline based on incidents occurring more than 18 
months prior to discipline unless the conduct is criminal); Hamlett v. Division of Mental 
Health, 325 So. 2d 696, 701 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (civil service employee cannot be discharged 
based on conduct for which he was suspended previously). Thus, progressive discipline and 
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In addition to disciplinary standards and procedures, unions 
permitted to bargain over disciplinary matters can be expected to 
negotiate a grievance and- arbitration procedure for appealing dis-
ciplinary decisions. Like the substantive and procedural provisions 
relating to discipline, inclusion of disciplinary matters in the cate-
gory of issues subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure 
will not have a negative impact on the merit principle. Most civil 
service systems based on the merit principle contain an appeals 
procedure that is applicable to many, if not all, disciplinary deci-
sions. 311 Accordingly, it cannot be contended that, in principle, ap-
peals procedures for discipline conflict with the merit system. A 
conflict with the merit principle arises only if union-negotiated pro-
cedures differ from civil service appeals procedures in some signif-
icant way that inhibits discipline based on merit. 
There are three potentially significant ways in which a union-
negotiated procedure may differ from a civil service procedure. 
First, the union procedure may permit appeals of lesser disciplinary 
penalties that may not be appealable under the civil service sys-
tem. 312 Second, the union procedure is likely to provide for arbitra-
tion by a mutually selected arbitrator or arbitration board as the 
final step of the appeal, rather than a hearing before the civil service 
commission.313 Third, the arbitration decision may be subject to 
narrower grounds for appeal than the decision of the commis-
sion. 314 
The first difference of allowing appeals of lesser penalties is 
not inconsistent with the merit system. Although such appeals might 
limit the flexibility of management, to the extent that they simply 
ensure that discipline is based on just cause rather than arbitrary 
considerations, permitting such appeals is completely consistent 
time limits on discipline, although limiting management's flexibility, do not interfere with 
employment decisions based on merit. Where public management believes that such limits 
are inconsistent with its needs, it can refuse to include such provisions in the collective 
bargaining agreement. Requiring negotiation about discipline does not require agreement to 
any particular disciplinary system. Progressive discipline and limits on the time period for 
which an employer can impose discipline for particular misconduct are consistent with notions 
of due process for public employees as evidenced by the fact that various civil service systems 
incorporate them. 
311 See D. STANLEY, supra note 1, at 55-56; see, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE,§§ 19578-19583 
(West 1980 & Supp. 1990); OR. R.Ev. STAT.§§ 241.430-.460 (1987); WASH. R.Ev. CoDE ANN. 
§§ 41.06.170-.220 (Supp. 1990). 
312 See D. STANLEY, supra note l, at 56; see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 11:15-1 (West 1976). 
313 See Hayford & Pegnetter, supra note 73, at 24, 25-26. 
m See id. at 24-26. 
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with employment based on merit. This is evidenced by the fact that 
some existing merit systems permit such appeals.315 The only ra-
tionale for: limiting such appeals is one of economy, but the parties 
should not be precluded from negotiating a grievance procedure 
covering discipline if they so desire. 
The second difference of using arbitrators to hear appeals, 
rather than civil service commissions, interferes with the merit prin-
ciple only if mutually selected arbitrators are more likely to force 
retention of poor employees or to permit discharge of competent 
employees than are civil service commissions. There is nothing to 
suggest such a result.316 A cadre of well-qualified labor arbitrators 
have been hearing and deciding both private and public sector 
arbitration cases for years.317 Although most arbitrators have sig-
nificantly more experience in the private than the public sector, no 
significant difference exists between the private and public sectors 
in deciding issues of just cause and compliance with procedural 
disciplinary requirements that would render this experience in-
applicable to the public sector.318 Because arbitration provisions 
commonly provide for mutual selection of the arbitrator,319 em-
ployers and unions have a means to eliminate unacceptable arbitra-
tors, including arbitrators who do not base decisions on the provi-
sions of the collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, negotiated 
arbitration provisions typically confine the arbitrator to interpreta-
tion and application of the agreement.320 A successful appeal is 
likely if .the arbitrator exceeds his or her authority under the con-
tract. 321 · 
315 See supra note 50. 
316 Wellington and Winter suggest that arbitrators should be more restricted in the 
public sector than in the private sector because they may expand the scope of bargaining, 
giving unions in arbitration what they have been unable to obtain in. negotiations. See H. 
WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note l, at 161-62. To the extent that this is a legitimate 
concern, which is subject to debate, there is little risk in the arbitration of discipline cases 
where the issue is whether just cause exists for discipline. 
317 Both the American Arbitration Association and the Federal Mediation and Concil-
iation Service supply arbitrators for labor disputes as do many state labor relations agencies. 
Holden, supra note 293, at 376. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1990); 
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.86 (West 1988). Issues arbitrated in the private sector do not differ 
substantially from those arbitrated in the public sector. Arbitrators typically apply the same 
standards to disputes in both arenas. See F. ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 67, at 10 & 
n.39 and works cited therein. · 
s1s See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
319 See Hayford & Pegnetter, supra note 73, at 24; D. STANLEY, supra note l, at 53. 
320 Hayford & Pegnetter, supra note 73, at 24. 
321 Id. at 24-25. 
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Indeed, there is reason to believe that arbitrators may be better 
able to decide appeals of disciplinary decisions than civil service 
commissions, based on their experience in the private sector in 
which a common law of arbitration has developed. 322 In contrast to 
arbitrators, who have a well-developed body of authority with re-
spect to discipline, civil service commissions often are dealing with 
relatively ·unfamiliar issues.323 In addition, many are primarily pol-
icymaking bodies with little time for lengthy hearing procedures 
and careful consideration of disciplinary issues. 324 These differences 
suggest that the merit principle is well served, and perhaps better 
served, by appeals procedures that end in neutral arbitration. 
There may well be other benefits of negotiated grievance pro-
cedures. Impartial review of grievances is important for employee 
morale.325 As noted earlier, employees do not view civil service 
commissions as impartial bodies, but rather as management 
agents.326 Thus, the acceptability of decisions on appeals is apt to 
be greater where the employee, through the union, has a role in 
selection of the arbitrator.327 Where employees believe that their 
position has been given a fair hearing, the decision is much more 
likely to resolve the dispute, minimizing further appeals and con-
tinuing employee dissatisfaction. 32s 
s22 See Killingsworth, supra note 297, at I I-I2. . 
525 Id. at I I, I3. Long-standing civil service commissions covering many employees may 
have rendered a sufficient number of decisions to have a body of authority. Even so, however, 
the number of decisions will be far more limited than available arbitral authority. Sec, e.g., F. 
ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, supra note 67; Lab. Arb. (BNA) Vols. I-92. In contrast to arbitration 
decisions, civil service commission decisions are not widely available to other commissions. 
s24 Killingsworth, supra note 297, at I I. 
525 Id. at I5. 
526 LMSA, supra note 7, at 2 I-22; see supra note 73 and accompanying text. If employees 
are not dissatisfied with civil service review of disciplinary decisions, then the union and the 
employer can agree in negotiations to retain exclusive civil service jurisdiction over discipline 
appeals. Even if the union has created employee dissatisfaction as an organizing issue, 
negotiation should not be precluded. If the issue is not sufficiently important to employees, 
it will not be pursued to impasse. If it is important, the origin of employee interest is irrelevant 
to the question of whether bargaining should be permitted. Allowing negotiation will further 
the purposes of the bargaining statute and should be prohibited only if it interferes with 
merit principles that are deemed weightier than the goals of the bargaining statute. 
527 Hayford & Pegnetter, supra note 73, at 27; see Killingsworth, supra note 297, at 11. 
The employees' perception of the lack of neutrality of the civil service commission may or 
may not be accurate. The degree of independence of civil service commissions varies widely. 
Killingsworth, supra note 297, at 6. It is at least arguable that the appointed commjssion 
members may have a conscious or unconscious loyalty to the public employer that appointed 
them, which might affect their decisions. Regardless of the reality, however, the perception 
oflack of neutrality is important because of the potential adverse effect on employee morale. 
528 Hayford & Pegnetter, supra note 73, at 27; see D. BoK & J. DUNLOP, supra note I5, 
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In addition, the arbitration system is more likely to provide 
employees with adequate representation in the appeals proce-
dure. 329 Few employees can afford competent legal representation 
for grievances.330 Where a negotiated grievance and arbitration 
procedure exists, the union normally represents the employee in 
the procedure. Representation of the employee by union officials 
or attorneys experienced in handling grievances will enhance the 
likelihood that the decision is based on the merits of the issue, rather 
than on the inabililty of the employee to present his or her position 
clearly. Furthermore, the employee is more likely to be satisfied 
with the outcome if the employee believes that his or her side of 
the story was properly presented and fairly considered.331 
The use of an impartial arbitrator may provide an additional 
benefit by encouraging the parties to be more reasonable in the 
earlier stages of the grievance procedure. 332 As a result, some dis-
putes that would otherwise be litigated may be settled without a 
hearing. Thus, the negotiated procedure may reduce the number 
of disputes that progress to the hearing stage, providing both cost 
savings and quicker resolution of disruptive and unproductive dis-
putes in the work place. 
In addition, the number of hearings may be reduced because 
the union serves a screening role in the grievance procedure, filter-
ing out frivolous grievances by declining to appeal them or by 
convincing the employee of the futility of an appeal. 333 Finally, the 
use of negotiated grievance and arbitration procedures and result-
ing union pressure on management with respect to discipline may 
force management to review and improve its personnel practices, 
imposing greater controls to ensure consistent discipline decisions 
based on employee merit. 334 The employment of a negotiated griev-
at 221 ("[I]t is clear beyond dispute that an effective, well-administered grievance procedure 
can play an indispensable role in improving labor relations and providing a measure of 
industrial due process to the workers involved."). 
s29 Hayford & Pegnetter, supra riote 73, at 27. 
sso Id. 
ss1 Id. If the union is permitted to represent employees in the civil service appeals 
procedure, and does so, this advantage of arbitration over civil service appeals will be 
eliminated. 
332 Killingsworth, supra note 297, at 15. 
sss See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S; 171, 191 (1967), in which the Supreme Court recognized 
the importance of this screening function performed by the union. 
ss.i See Lewin, supra note 16, at 432-33 (citing Begin, The Private Grievance Model in the 
Public Sector, 10 INDUS. REL. 34 (1971)); D. STANLEY, supra note 1, at 56-57. Most managers 
interviewed by Stanley believed that this union pressure was good for both management and 
employees. Id. at 56-58. 
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ance procedure with impartial arbitration, therefore, may enhance, 
rather than interfere with, the merit principle of employment. 
The difference in appellate standards for arbitration and civil 
service appeals has no uniform identifiable impact on the merit 
principle. In states where the Steelworkers Trilogy335 principles of 
arbitration review are followed, judicial review of arbitration awards 
generally will be more limited than review of civil service deci-
sions. 336 If a particular administrative or arbitral decision is contrary 
to the merit principle, limited judicial review may adversely affect 
the merit principle in that case. There is no guarantee, however, 
that availability of more extensive judicial review would result in 
reversal of the decision. Furthermore, there is a possibility that 
expansive judicial review may result in reversal of decisions made 
in accordance with the merit principle. In the absence of an un-
founded assumption that arbitration decisions will be contrary to 
the merit principle and court decisions in accordance with the merit 
principle, one cannot conclude that any difference in judicial review 
will interfere with the goal of merit-based employment. 
As detailed above, authorizing negotiation of disciplinary mat-
ters will not adversely affect the merit principle of employment.337 
335 In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the United States Supreme Court set forth principles 
regarding the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate and the court's role in reviewing 
arbitration awards in the private sector. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car 
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (courts should not review the merits of an arbitration award 
under a collective bargaining agreement); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960) (in a suit to compel arbitration, the role of the court is 
limited to determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute and doubts should 
be resolved in favor of arbitration); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 
564, 567-68 (1960) (in determining whether to order arbitration, the courts "have no business 
weighing the merits of the grievance," which is the function of the arbitrator). Pursuant to 
the Trilogy, courts have accorded decisions of arbitrators in the private sector substantial 
deference. See Craver, The judicial Enforcement of Public Sector Grievance Arbitration, 58 TEX. 
L. REv. 329, 341-43 (1980). Most states that have addressed the issue have adopted, although 
not always followed, similarly limited standards of review. Id. at 345-48; H. EDWARDS, R.T. 
CLARK, JR. & c. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAw IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 745 (3d ed. 1985). 
336 See Hayford & Pegnetter, supra note 73, at 24-26. The most common standard for 
judicial review of civil service commission decisions is "substantial evidence.'' Hayford & 
Pegnetter, State Employee Grievances and Due Process: An Analysis of Contract Arbitration and Civil 
Service Review Systems, 29 S.C.L. REv. 305, 323 (1978). 
337 It is, of course, conceivable that under certain circumstances, however rare, a union 
might seek ·to negotiate a contractual provision inimical to the merit principle. Given the 
unlikelihood of the possibility, restricting negotiations over discipline is not justified. Man-
agement's inclination to resist such demands is a natural obstacle to agreement to such 
provisions and must be relied upon to prevent agreement. The provisions in some statutes 
authorizing discipline for cause also provide a check on such actions. A statutory provision 
prohibiting agreement to clauses inconsistent with the merit principle would provide a further 
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Indeed, as noted,338 such negotiations may promote employment 
based on merit by encouraging management to ensure that person-
nel decisions are based on merit in order to avoid losing griev-
ances. 339 In addition, there are other positive values that may result 
from permitting negotiation of disciplinary matters. Where the par-
ties are able to negotiate about disciplinary standards and proce-
dures, the resulting agreement will be more responsive to the needs 
of the part;ies to the collective bargaining relationship. The em-
ployer and the union can structure the standards and procedures 
in the way that is most useful, appropriate, and efficient. In one 
employment setting, a grievance procedure with fewer steps and 
quicker resolution may be most workable. In another, the parties 
may need more time to investigate and respond tp grievances, and 
may be more concerned about issues of due process than speedy 
resolution. Moreover, where the civil service procedure is workable 
and acceptable, the parties are free to adopt that procedure in lieu 
of, or as an alternative to, any negotiated grievance procedure. 
Not only will a negotiated agreement on these issues be more 
appropriate to the particular needs of the employer and the em-
ployees, but the decisions that result from a procedure that the 
parties have designed, in most cases, will be more acceptable to the 
parties.340 Having created the procedure, the parties have a stake 
in its success. Thus, in all probability, the procedure will resolve 
disputes more successfully, minimizing the continuing disruption of 
the work place that may be caused by the perception that discipline 
is either unfairly administered or improperly overturned.341 Fur-
limitation. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT.§ 89-9(d) (1988). Such a provision offers the parties an 
arguable basis on which to refuse to negotiate many potential bargaining subjects, however, 
thereby injecting substantial uncertainty into the negotiating process. 
sss See supra note 334 and accompanying text. 
ss9 Union grievance procedures will" have a greater effect in this regard than civil service 
appeals procedures for several reasons. Because such procedures are perceived as fair, they 
will be used more often by employees. See Hayford & Pegnetter, supra note 73, at 27. The 
grievance procedures also will be used more often and more effectively because the employees 
will have union representation, rather than having to pay an attorney or handle the procedure 
themselves. See id.; D. STANLEY, supra note 1, at 56. Supervisors may fear, with or without 
basis, that a neutral arbitrator will overturn their decisions more readily than the civil service 
commission, based upon their perception of the commission's lack of neutrality, which is 
similar to the perception of employees. Finally, supervisors may view defeat in a union 
grievance procedure more adversely than loss of a case before the civil service commission. 
340 See supra notes 327-31 and accompanying text. 
341 Management representatives will be dissatisfied if they believe that their decisions to 
discipline are reversed arbitrarily; employees will be dissatisfied if they believe that discipline 
is administered unfairly without a fair opportunity for review of the decision. Either of these 
perceptions will cause problems in the employment setting. Although a negotiated procedure 
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thermore, the process of negotiations is therapeutic and will pro· 
mote harmonious labor relations by allowing the parties to discuss 
problems and vent frustrations.342 Giving employees a voice in de· 
termining their working conditions in order to avoid labor unrest 
and resulting disruption is a significant goal of collective bargaining 
laws that will be furthered by authorizing negotiation regarding 
employee discipline. 
There has been substantial discussion in the literature regard· 
ing whether differences between the private sector and the public 
sector require different conclusions about the appropriate scope of 
bargaining in the public sector.343 Scholars disagree about the extent 
to which the scope of bargaining in the public sector should be 
limited because government is the employer, and indeed, whether 
any differentiation from the private sector is required. The primary 
concern voiced by those who would limit negotiations is that unions 
may become too powerful an interest group in a collective bargain· 
will not completely eliminate such views, it should minimize them because of the participation 
of management and the employees, through the union, in designing the procedure. 
342 Edwards, supra note l, at 916. If, as posited, the arbitration process has significant 
advantages over the civil service appeals procedure in the accomplishment of the objectives 
of civil service law, then perhaps the arbitration procedure should be imposed by statute for 
all employees covered by civil service protections. See Hayford & Pegnetter, supra note 73, at 
28. Imposition of such a requirement arguably would be more efficient than simply permit· 
ting negotiation of a grievance and arbitration procedure because it would avoid the costs 
associated with bargaining. The disadvantage of a statutory procedure is that it does not 
provide the benefits of the bargaining process, including, inter alia, permitting the parties to 
negotiate a procedure designed to meet their needs, see supra notes 339-40 and accompanying 
text, and giving the parties a stake in the success of the procedure by virtue of their role in 
negotiating it. See supra notes 327-31, 340-41 and accompanying text. In addition, a statutory 
procedure does not afford the benefits of the therapeutic function of negotiations, see 
Edwards, supra note 1, at 916, and the union's function in screening out frivolous grievances. 
See supra note 333 and accompanying text. In order to retain these benefits, even where a 
statutory arbitration procedure exists, the parties should be permitted to negotiate alternative 
procedures, as long as the statlltory minima are met. Having determined that bargaining is 
beneficial to the employer, the employees, and the public interest by enacting a collective 
bargaining statute, the state should not restrict negotiations in the important area of discipline 
even when a statutory arbitration procedure is available. It is notable that some collective 
bargaining statutes require that the agreement of the parties contains a grievance and 
arbitration procedure. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1710(c) (Smith-Hurd 1986); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.20 (West Supp. 1990). Although such statutes require a binding 
grievance and arbitration procedure, the parties are free to negotiate the type of procedure 
within these limits. Similar provisions related to statutory arbitration procedures would retain 
the advantages of allowing bargaining without requiring the sacrifice of the benefits of 
binding arbitration. 
343 See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note l, at 21-30; Edwards, supra note 
1, at 885-87. See generally Summers, Public Emp[qyee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE 
LJ. 1156 (1974); Wollett, The Bargaining Process in the Public Sector: What is Bargainable?, 51 
OR. L. REv. 177 (1971). 
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ing system, drowning out the voices of the citizens on issues of 
public interest. 344 
Analyzing this concern, Professor Clyde Summers suggests a 
solution that determines negotiability of issues on the basis of 
whether the public employees need a more effective method of 
being heard on a particular concern because of massed political 
opposition. 345 Summers concludes that, in general, discipline is an 
appropriate subject for negotiation. He notes that management's 
resistance to union demands to bargain about discipline is com-
monly based on the argument that limits on disciplinary discretion 
reduce efficiency.346 Because the public is equally concerned about 
efficiency, 347 its interest will be represented by management at the 
bargaining table. 348 Thus, there is no need for an additional mech-
anism for public input. Accordingly, even if one accepts the argu-
ment that different limitations on the scope of negotiable issues are 
necessary in the public sector,349 that conclusion does not require 
limiting or barring negotiation of disciplinary issues. 350 
344 See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note l, at 29-32. 
3<5 Summers, supra note 343, at 1193. 
s.s Id. at 1196. 
347 The existence of civil service systems with disciplinary protections confirms that the 
interest of the public is in employment based on merit, which translates, in large part, to 
efficiency. 
34s Summers, supra note 343, at 1196. 
349 See Wollett, supra note 343, for a persuasive argument that such limitations are not 
required. 
350 Summers does note one aspect of discipline that he suggests should not be the subject 
of negotiations. Summers, supra note 343, at 1196. Summers contends that demands by police 
officers for disciplinary procedures that do not permit the use of public review boards are 
likely to be agreed to by management, but perhaps opposed by public interest groups who 
fear police abuse. Id. at 1196-97. If Summers is correct, the legislature could preclude any 
agreement that would restrict management's ability to establish a public review board, thus 
leaving the issue to the political process. If there is sufficient political pressure for such a 
board, management would have the option to institute it. Alternatively, if public pressure 
for such a board is strong, management may be forced to take a posture in favor of such a 
board in collective bargaining. The latter alternative is, of course, somewhat inconsistent with 
the view that public pressure will not be strong enough to counter union pressure and the 
public desire to avoid a strike. In any event, this narrow concern is not sufficient to preclude 
bargaining on any disciplinary issues. See Pontiac Police Officers Association v. City of Pontiac, in 
which the Michigan Supreme Court held that, although it might be desirable to provide for 
a civilian role in the police disciplinary process, it was up to the legislature to make such a 
determination. 397 Mich. 674, 683-84, 246 N.W.2d 831, 835-36, 94 L.R.R.M. 2175, 2177-
78 (1976). The court found that disciplinary and grievance procedures were encompassed 
by the statutory definition of bargaining subjects and, therefore, bargaining over such matters 
was required. Id. at 680-81, 246 N.W.2d at 834, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2176-77; see also ILL. REv. 
STAT. ANN. ch. 24, paras. 10.1-18.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990), which provides for a separate 
procedure for appeal of discipline of police officers in cities over 500,000 than for other civil 
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VJ. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
A. States Enacting or Substantially Amending Collective Bargaining 
Laws 
Having concluded that negotiation over disciplinary issues fur-
thers the goals of collective bargaining statutes and is compatible 
with the merit system, the determination as to the best method for 
implementing such bargaining remains. As suggested in section IV 
A supra, any state considering enactment of a bargaining statute 
should consider and specifically address the potential conflict with 
civil service.351 In the absence of statutory provisions, courts will 
have little or no guidance when faced with conflicts. Furthermore, 
both negotiability of issues and enforcement of contract provisions 
covered by civil service law should be expressly addressed.352 Con-
tractual provisions addressing disciplinary issues should be both 
negotiable and enforceable. 
With respect to negotiability, the Connecticut statutory provi-
sions exemplify the most effective statutory approach, providing 
sufficient specificity without unreasonably restricting the flexibility 
of the parties in negotiations or creating unnecessarily confusing 
issues of interpretation.353 The Connecticut statute addresses the 
entire scope of potential conflict with civil service law, which is 
preferable to provisions limited to discipline and discharge. Simi-
larly, with respect to enforceability, a statutory provision that ad-
dresses the range of potential conflicting laws is most advanta-
geous. 354 In this regard, the Illinois approach is commendable 
because it provides that the collective bargaining statute and collec-
service employees. The appeals procedure for police officers utilizes a police board appointed 
by the mayor with majority representation from city residents, rather than the civil service 
commission. See id. paras. 10.1-18.l and 3-7-3.l. Where the civil service law contains such 
a structure, a legislature desiring to preserve civilian review could give those provisions of 
the civil service statute priority over the collective bargaining agreement and preclude ne-
gotiation over the issue. 
351 See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text. 
352 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. 
353 See supra notes 185-86, 190-93 and accompanying text. The Ohio statute has similar 
provisions. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text. A sample of recommended 
statutory provisions is included in Appendix I. 
354 See Schmedemann, supra note 259, at 253-56 for a discussion of one approach to 
deal with potentially conflicting statutes. 
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tive bargaining agreements negotiated thereunder supersede con-
flicting laws. 355 In the event that there are certain conflicting laws 
that the legislature wishes to exempt from this provision for both 
negotiation and enforcement purposes, an explicit exemption could 
be included in the collective bargaining statute.356 
Alternatively, the collective bargaining statute could contain a 
provision preempting all statutes except those that contain language 
expressly exempting them from preemption by collective bargain-
ing. States enacting collective bargaining laws also should review 
civil service statutes for provisions that might raise issues of conflict. 
To the extent that civil service laws suggest that disciplinary and/or 
appeals procedures included therein are exclusive,-the civil service 
law should be amended to authorize collective bargaining over such 
issues. 357 · 
An additional consideration must be taken into account by 
states enacting collective bargaining laws against a background of 
existing civil service laws. Where the parties are permitted to ne-
gotiate alternatives to the civil service appeals procedure, the leg-
islature must decide whether both procedures remain available, 
whether the contractual procedure supersedes the grievance pro-
cedure, or whether the employee must choose one procedure or 
the other.358 There is little to recommend allowing employees access 
to both procedures except to provide the losing party a second bite 
355 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. An alternative approach would be to 
provide that disputes over discipline should be resolved in accordance with the collective 
bargaining agreement. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 240.321(2), (3), (4) (1987) (allowing terms 
and conditions of employment to be determined by the contract notwithstanding the civil 
service provisions regarding discipline). A provision directed solely at discipline, however, 
does not address the potential conflicts with other laws or even the other potential conflicts 
with civil service Jaws. 
356 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CooE ANN. § 4l17.10 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). A sample of the 
recommended statutory provisions is included in Appendix I. 
357 Because a civil service provision gave exclusive jurisdiction over civil si;:rvice employee 
discharges to the civil service commission, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a civil service 
employee discharge was not subject to arbitration. Devine v. City of Des Moines, 366 N .W.2d 
580, 582-83, 122 L.R.R.M. 3109, 311l (Iowa 1985). 
358 Under the New York statute, the union can negotiate a grievance and arbitration 
procedure that eliminates the employee's right to use the civil service procedure. See Antinore 
v. State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 6, 8, 10-ll, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215, 216-17, 90 L.R.R.M. 
2127, 2128-29 (1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 921, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576, 358 N.E.2d 268, 94 L.R.R.M. 
2224 (1976). In Minnesota, the employee may opt for the contractual procedure or the 
statutory procedure, but cannot pursue both. See MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 179A.20 (West Supp. 
1990). 
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at the apple. If the employee must initiate and pursue both proce-
dures, then only the employee will have two opportunities to prevail 
because an employee who wins in one forum will have no incentive 
to continue proceedings in the other forum. 
Moreover, if proceedings in two forums are permitted, signif-
icant issues of collateral estoppel and res judicata are raised.359 
There also is a distinct possibility of conflicting judgments, yielding 
further litigation. Such problems can be avoided by limiting the 
issue to one forum. Although such a limitation may not be war-
ranted where the issues to be litigated in the two forums differ and 
the expertise of the particular forum is important for deciding the 
issues,360 here the issues will be virtually identical, i.e., whether the 
employee was disciplined for just cause. There is nothing unique 
about the issues that would require the special expertise of the 
appeals board or the arbitrator to make a fair and reasoned deci-
sion. Litiga,ting the same issue in two similar forums is highly inef-
ficient and expends resources unnecessarily. 
There are several alternatives available to address this problem. 
The statute could provide that, where a negotiated grievance pro-
cedure exists, disputes are to be resolved using the negotiated pro-
cedure rather than the statutory appeals procedure.361 This ap-
proach preserves the statutory appeals procedure if no alternative 
is negotiated. On the other hand, it allows, but does not require, 
the union to waive the employee's access to the statutory proce-
ssg See Board of Governors v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 170 Ill. App. 3d 463, 
481-84, 524 N.E.2d 758, 768-70 (1988). 
360 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55-60 (1974), in which the 
Supreme Court held that voluntary submission of a discrimination claim to binding arbitra-
tion does not preclude a subsequent action in federal court based on Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act because of the intent to provide overlapping remedies in cases of discrimination 
and the significant differences between the arbitral and statutory processes. See also McDonald 
v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1984) (arbitration does not preclude subse-
quent suit under section 1983 because arbitrators may lack the expertise and contractual 
authority to resolve section 1983 claims, arbitral factfinding is not equivalent to judicial 
factfinding, and union control over the arbitration process may adversely affect the employ-
ee's claim); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 734 (1981) (arbitra-
tion does not preclude action under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Town of Dedham v. 
Labor Relations Comm'n, 365 Mass. 392, 400-06, 312 N.E.2d 548, 555-59, 85 L.R.R.M. 
2918, 2922-25 (1974) (existence of civil service statutory remedy does not deprive Labor 
Relations Commission of jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claim of discriminatory dis-
cipline because of differences in issues, rights, and remedies). 
ss1 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 4117.lO(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1989). 
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dure.362 Although some states have upheld such a waiver,363 a leg-
islature may be reluctant to take such a step. Certainly, the statute 
must ensure that the negotiated procedure provides all the consti-
tutionally required due process protections.364 Furthermore, in the 
event that a state constitution guarantees the right to civil service 
appeals,365 this option may not be available to the legislature. In 
such a· state, depending on the constitutional language, the legisla-
ture might be forced to allow a dual forum or prohibit negotiations 
on the issue. 366 
s52 A rational union will waive the appeals procedure only if a majority of the employees 
so desire because the union must satisfy its constituency. There may be a minority of 
employees, however, who prefer the civil service procedure and are therefore dissaµsfied. 
Of course, this type of collective decisionmaking is the very essence of collective bargaining. 
s5s See, e.g., Antinore v. State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 6, 10-11, 371N.Y.S.2d213, 216-
18, 90 L.R.R.M. 2127, 2128-29 (1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 921, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576, 358 N.E.2d 
268, 94 L.R.R.M. 2224 (1976). 
s54 Where the grievance and arbitration procedure contains procedural safeguards, the 
procedure satisfies the constitutional due process requirements arid can be substituted for a 
statutory procedure. See Gorham v. City of Kansas City, 225 Kan. 369, 378, 590 P.2d 1051, 
1058, 101 L.R.R.M. 2290, 2294 (1979);-Antinore, 49 A.D.2d at 9, 10, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 216, 90 
L.R.R.M. at 2128; see also Jackson v. Temple Univ., 721 F.2d 931, 933, 114 L.R.R.M. 3579, 
3580 (3d Cir. 1983) (no due process violation where union declined to arbitrate employee's 
grievance); Stephens v. Postmaster Gen., 623 F.2d 594, 595, 596, 104 L.R.R.M. 2808, 2809, 
2810 (9th Cir. 1980) (no due .Process violation where union cancelled arbitration because 
employee contractually waived right to arbitration by filing civil service appeal, even though 
the civil service appeal was dismissed as untimely). For a thorough discussion of due process 
issues relating to public employee grievances, see generally Note, Public Sector Grievance 
Procedures, Due Process and the Duty of Fair Representation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 752 (1976). 
565 See CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a) (Supp. 1990) (the personnel board shall review 
disciplinary actions of state employees); Cow. CONST. art. XII,§ 13(8) (1980) (any disciplinary 
action against personnel system employees shall be subject to appeal to the state personnel 
board); LA. CONST. art. 10, § 8(A) (West Supp. 1989) (a classified employee subjected to 
disciplinary action shall have the right of appeal to the appropriate commission). This 
provision applies to state employees and employees in cities over 400,000. LA. CoNST. art. 
10, §§ 1, 12 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). 
s66 Although the California Constitution provides that the State Personnel Board has 
the authority to review all disciplinary actions, CAL. CoNST. art. VII, § 3(a), this provision 
has not been construed to prohibit negotiations over disciplinary matters. See Comment, 
supra note 227, at 848-:-52. Instead, proposals regarding discipline have been found negotiable 
unless they completely remove the Personnel Board's authority to review disciplinary deci-
sions. See id. and cases cited therein. For example, a proposal that required just cause for 
discipline and permitted alleged violations of this requirement to be challenged through the 
grievance procedure was held to be negotiable because it allowed the Personnel Board to 
review all ultimate decisions on such grievances, including arbitration awards. Id. at 852 
(citing Department of Forestry Employees, Hearing Officer's Proposed Decision (Apr. 17, 
1984), 8 Pub. Employee Rep. Cal. (LRP) 443, 446, 457 n.6 finalized in mem. op., 8 Pub. 
Employee Rep. Cal. (LRP) 602 (May 7, 1984)); see also supra note 92 for the effect of the 
Michigan constitutional provisions regarding civil service on collective "bargaining for state 
employees. 
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A second alternative is to provide by statute that the employee 
has the choice of the statutory procedure or the negotiated proce-
dure, but cannot use both.367 This approach eliminates concerns 
about union waivers of employee rights, as well as the need to 
ensure that the grievance procedure provides sufficient due process 
protection.368 Providing the employee with an option will encourage 
acceptance of the decision because the statute has permitted the 
employee to choose the forum that he or she believes will hear the 
case most fairly. At the same time, this option avoids the problems 
of a dual forum. 
The drawback of this procedure is that it allows issues of dis-
cipline to be decided by two different forums if employees so 
choose. Although each employee is restricted to one forum, some 
disciplinary issues may be decided under civil service procedures 
and standards, and others under contractual procedures and stan-
dards. Availability of dual procedures interferes with the develop-
ment of a uniform body of authority with respect to disciplinary 
matters, which would provide predictability and stability for the 
employer, the employees, and the union.369 Furthermore, to the 
extent that the grievance procedure is an extension of the bargain-
ing process designed to further the goals of the bargaining statute, 
permitting employees to use civil service procedures in the absence 
of agreement by the employer and the union that these procedures 
are the appropriate exclusive forum for disciplinary appeals, frus-
trates the statutory objectives.370 
A third alternative is to prohibit litigation of the same issue in 
both forums by statute, but to allow the parties in negotiations to 
decide whether to limit employees to the grievance procedure or to 
give employees a choice of forums. This option retains the most 
flexibility for the parties in negotiations. Such flexibility enables 
367 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 179A.20 (West Supp. 1990). The Civil Service Reform 
Act, whjch covers federal employees, provides such an option. See Craver, The Regulation of 
Federal Sector Labor Relations: Overlapping Administrative Responsibilities, 39 LAB. L.J. 387, 399 
(1988). 
368 Because the employee has the option to choose a civil service procedure that complies 
with due process protections, the choice of the grievance procedure should be considered a 
knowing waiver of the constitutional right without the necessity of inquiring whether the 
grievance procedure meets due process requirements. Individuals can waive constitutional 
protections as long as the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See D.H. Overmeyer 
Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1971); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
For further discussion of the due process issues, see Note, supra note 364, at 769-92. 
369 See Note, supra note 364, at 764. 
370 See id. 
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tradeoffs, which are essential to effective collective bargaining.371 
Further, it permits the parties to determine which system best suits 
their particular relationship. 
The disadvantage to this third approach is that it allows the 
union to restrict employee access to the appeals procedure. The 
state constitution and existing civil service laws must be examined 
carefully to ensure that there is no conflict. In the event of conflict 
with the civil service law, a statutory amendment would easily resolve 
the issue, but, in the absence of a constitutional amendment, a 
constitutional conflict may doom this approach. 
B. States with Existing Collective Bargaining Laws 
States with existing bargaining laws fall into two categories-
those with language or definitive case law372 holding that negotiation 
over disciplinary issues is prohibited, and those in which there is no 
clear language or available definitive case law. In these former states, 
the statute must be amended to permit bargaining. 
The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, held in Devine v. City 
of Des Moines that discharged employees were limited to civil service 
grievance procedures.373 The court reasoned that the language of 
the civil service statute gave exclusive jurisdiction over discharge 
procedures to the civil service commission.374 The court also relied 
on language in the collective bargaining statute that provided that 
the Iowa Code prevailed over conflicting provisions of collective 
bargaining agreements. 375 Yet the collective bargaining statute also 
provided that the contractual grievance procedure, not the civil 
service appeals procedure, should be followed where available.376 
Given this provision of the Iowa Code, the court logically could 
have concluded that, by enacting the collective bargaining statute 
subsequent to the civil service statute, the legislature modified the 
civil service statute to the extent of conflict. Therefore, the contrac-
tual grievance and arbitration procedure was available to employees 
challenging their discharges. Nevertheless, in view of the Devine 
decision, in order to accomplish the above recommendations, the 
m See Schmedemann, supra note 259, at 220. 
s12 For purposes of this discussion, only state supreme court decisions are considered 
definitive case law. 
m 366 N.W.2d 580, 122 L.R.R.M. 3109 (Iowa 1985); see supra note 202 and accom-
panying text. 
s14 See Devine, 366 N.W.2d at 582, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3110. 
m Id. at 583, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3111. 
s1s See lowA CooE ANN. § 20.18 (West 1989). 
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legislature must amend the civil service law to make it clear that 
classified employees may enforce negotiated grievance and arbitra-
tion procedures in discharge cases. Because the Iowa statute ex-
plicitly enumerates many negotiable matters, including grievance 
procedures, but does not specifically mention discipline, inclusion 
of discipline in the listed items for negotiations would further clarify 
the issue. 
Other states also would require amendments to their statutes 
to permit negotiation. In New Mexico, for example, the State Per-
sonnel Board would have to amend its rules to authorize negotiation 
over discipline and to allow contractual arbitration of dismissals, 
demotions, and suspensions.377 In New Jersey, the legislature would 
have to amend the statute to omit the restriction that provides that 
disciplinary review procedures cannot replace or be inconsistent 
with statutory appeals procedures and cannot provide for binding 
arbitration of disciplinary disputes where civil service procedures 
exist.378 Because courts have interpreted these provisions to pre-
clude negotiations over any discipline-related proposal, with appro-
priately clear evidence of legislative intent, this change should per-
mit negotiation and enforcement of contract provisions relating to 
discipline. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has upheld the Public 
Employee Labor Relations Board's decision that proposals relating 
to employee discipline are not negotiable.379 As in the case of Iowa, 
this result does not appear to be dictated by the statute that pre-
cludes bargaining over managerial policy matters and policies and 
practices of any merit system relating to recruitment, examination, 
appointment, and advancement.380 Again, however, a clarifying 
amendment that specifically authorizes negotiation over disciplinary 
policies, procedures, and related contract provisions, including the 
grievance and arbitration procedure, would be necessary to establish 
a bargaining requirement in light of the decision. 
In jurisdictions where the bargaining obligation and enforcea-
bility of contract provisions relating to discipline are unsettled is-
sues, statutory amendment along the suggested lines381 would clarify 
sn See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text. 
378 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
379 State Employees Ass'n v. New Hampshire Pub. Employee Relations Bd., 118 N.H. 
885, 889-90, 397 A.2d 1035, 1037-38, 100 L.R.R.M. 2485, 2480 (1978). See supra note 187 
and accompanying text. 
3so See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 273-A:l, A:3 (1987). 
381 See supra notes 351-71 and accompanying text. 
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the legislative intent. In most cases, however, statutory amendment 
is unnecessary. In states like Hawaii, where the statute prohibits 
agreement to proposals inconsistent with the merit principle,382 ad-
ministrative agencies a_nd courts faced with issues regarding nego-
tiability and enforceability of contract clauses on disciplinary matters 
can and should conclude that such proposals are negotiable because, 
as demonstrated, negotiation about these issues does not conflict 
with the merit principle.383 
When faced with language in the collective bargaining statute 
that limits negotiability or enforceability to matters not in conflict 
with other statutes,384 states should carefully examine these other 
statutes to determine whether the .conflict is real. Courts and ad-
ministrative agencies should not preclude bargaining over discipli-
nary issues unless there is clear prohibition on such negotiation or 
direct conflict with existing statutory law. For example, if the civil 
service statute· provides an appeals procedure but nowhere suggests 
that it is the exclusive means for challenging disciplinary decisions, 
there should be no bar to nego.tiating a grievance and arbitration 
procedure that covers disciplinary decisions.385 
Similarly, where the collectiv~ bargaining statute is silent with 
respect to conflict, administrat.ive agern;:ies and courts should follow 
the analysis of the Michigan and Oregon courts.386 First, the tril;mnal 
should attempt to determine whether the statutes can be acc-0m-
modated. Where there is no direct prohibition on -negotiation of 
disciplinary issues in the civil service statute, the tribunal should 
permit negotiation and enforcement of negotiated provisions. Be-
cause there is no conflict with the merit principle, permitting bar-
gaining over disciplinary issues will effectuate the legislative intent 
of both statutes by requiring negotiation to settle labor disputes 
and, at the same time, preserving merit-based employment. Where 
a clear conflict exists, and the collective bargaining statute is a later 
ss2 See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. The Vermont and Maine state 
employees statutes and the Alaska statute should be construed similarly. See supra notes 176, 
178-82, 254 and accompanying text. 
sss See supra notes 291-350 and accompanying text for a discussion of the compatibility 
between negotiating disciplinary issues and the merit principle. In the improbable event that 
these decisionmakers should be faced with a proposal unquestionably inconsistent with the 
merit principle, such as a proposal that decisions relating to termination be based on political 
loyalty, the opposite conclusion could be reached. 
sS4 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Purdon Supp. 1990). 
sss See, e.g., Board of Governors v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 170 Ill. App. 3d 
463, 470-72, 475, 524 N.E.2d 758, 761-62, 64 (1988). 
sss See supra notes 92-93, 98-101 and accompanying text. 
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enactment providing comprehensive coverage of the public em-
ployment relations of the employees in the statute, the tribunal 
should conclude that the legislature intended the collective bargain-
ing statute to govern. 387 As long as the description of bargainable 
subjects is susceptible to an interpretation that would include em-
ployee discipline, bargaining over all aspects of discipline should be 
required and the resulting agreement should be enforceable.388 
Using these principles of statutory construction, courts and 
administrative agencies in most states where the issue is unsettled 
should conclude that negotiation over disciplinary matters is re-
quired in order to effectuate the purposes of both collective bar-
gaining and civil service statutes. The policies discussed herein that 
underlie the collective bargaining laws support such a conclusion. 
Moreover, the merit principles that are the primary focus of civil 
service laws will not be affected adversely, and indeed, may even be 
furthered. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
States can resolve the perceived conflict between civil service 
law and bargaining over employee discipline without interfering 
with the goals of either statute. Although statutory provisions may 
appear to conflict, pern;iitting negotiation over disciplinary proce-
dures and standards does not hinder and may, in fact, promote 
merit employment. Accordingly, states should allow unions and 
employers to negotiate over these issues and to determine the ap-
propriate disciplinary procedures and standards for the relevant 
employment setting. This can be accomplished either by statutory 
authorization for negotiation and enforcement of disciplinary mat-
ters in existing or newly enacted collective bargaining or civil service 
laws, or by interpretive case law. Where necessary, statutes should 
be amended to permit the negotiating parties to decide the appli-
cable disciplinary standards and procedures. Such action will pre-
serve merit employment and enhance labor peace, thus furthering 
two important public policies in the employment arena. 
387 See, e.g., Wayne County Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Board of Supervisors, 384 Mich. 363, 
371-77, 184 N.W.2d 201, 204-06, 77 L.R.R.M. 2034, 2036-38 (1971). 
388 If the statute specifies negotiable subjects and expressly limits negotiation to those 
subjects, the absence of discipline and/or grievance and arbitration procedures would pre-
clude an interpretation that bargaining over those subjects was required. 
APPENDIX I 
Sample recommended statutory language regarding: 
Negotiability 
Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obli-
gation of the employer or its designated representatives and the 
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment, except as provided in subsection (a) 
of this section, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incor-
porating. any agreement reached if requested by either party, but 
such obligation shall not compel either party to agree to a proposal 
or require the making of a concession. 1 
(a) The conduct and grading of civil service examinations, the 
rating of candidates, and the establishment of lists from such ex-
aminations and the original appointments from the eligibles list shall 
not be subject to collective bargaining.2 
Enforceability 
The provisions of this Act and any collective bargaining agree-
ment negotiated thereunder shall prevail over any other law, ex-
ecutive order, administrative regulation, charter, ordinance, or 
other rule or regulation, except as otherwise expressly specified by 
the legislature. 3 
1 This language is taken substantially from the Connecticut statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5-272(c) (West 1988), which is patterned after the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d) (1988), indicating a broad scope of bargaining 
2 This proposal is an amalgam of the Connecticut and Ohio statutes. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 5-272(d) (West 1988) and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 41l 7.08(B) (Baldwin 1983). The 
legislature must decide which aspects of the appointment process should be exempted from 
negotiation. 
s This provision is an amalgam of Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, para. 1615 (Smith-Hurd 1986) 
and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4117.lO(A) (Baldwin 1989). The modifications are designed to 
clarify the legislature's intent that the collective bargaining statute shall prevail unless oth-
envise expressly provided in the collective bargaining statute or another legislative enactment. 
Such a provision would require the review of other laws to avoid unintended preemption of 
the bargaining statute but allows the legislature to preempt bargaining by subsequent enact-
ments without amending the bargaining law. 
The legislature must decide which, if any, laws should prevail over negotiated provisions. 
Ohio, for example, has provided that laws regarding retirement, affirmative action, and 
workers' compensation, among others, supersede collectively bargained agreements. See id. 
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APPENDIX II 
Statute1 w/ Statute Statute 
No Provision Silent2 w/Disc w/Gcn'l 





Calif (mun)s x 
Calif (state) x 
Colorado x 
Conn (mun) x 







Ill (public) x 






Maine (pub) x 
Maine (state) x 







Neb (local) x 
Neb (state) x 
Nev (local) x 
New Hamp x 
New Jersey x 
NM (state) x 





and ffs) x 
Ore (local) x 
Ore (state) x 
Pennsylvania x 
Rhode Island x 




and ffs) x 
Utah x 
































1 Many of the statutes listed in this category are limited in scope and/or _coverage of 
employees. They differ from the category of silent statutes because of the absence of deci-
sional law. 
2 Silent statutes have no statutory provision, but ar.e .distinguish_ed from the previous 
category because there is some decisional law on the issue. 
3 These statutory provisions relate directly to the issue of discipline and in,clude provisions 
on negotiability, enforceability, or both. 
4 These statutory provisions include gene!<\! provisions regarding conflict with other 
statutes and provisions specific to conflicts between civil service law and the bargaining statute. 
This category includes states with provisions regarding negotiability only, enforceability only, 
and states with provi~ions relating to both. 
5 States that have more than one statute with relevant provisions are listed by statute 
with the employees covered by the particular statute in parentheses. 
